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COMMENT
AN ARGUMENT FOR AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
FOR LETTERS TO THE EDITOR AFTER IMMUNO
AG v. MOOR-JANKOWSKI*
[W]hen a citizen is troubled by things going wrong, he should be free
"to write to the newspaper": and the newspaper should be free to
publish his letter. It is often the only way to get things put right...
[Neither the writer nor the newspaper] should.., be deterred by fear
of libel actions.'
INTRODUCTION
Citizen participation in public debate has shaped American
history. From the Federalist Papers arguing for the ratification
of the United States Constitution2 to the pleas of conscience of
the civil rights movement," letters to the editor have provided a
medium for that participation. A letter to the editor is a "tom
meeting in print ' 4 that gives citizen-critics a First Amendment
* 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991).
Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 10, 16, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16
(2d Dep't 1985), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 778, 492 N.E.2d 125, 501 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1986) (neither a
newspaper publisher nor a writer was liable for a letter to the editor accusing a 17-year-
old of criminal conduct) (quoting Slim v. Daily Telegraph, 1 All E.R. 497, 503 (1963)).
I ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Edward M. Earle ed.,
1937)(1788). Publius's letters were published in a number of newspapers. HERR
BRUCKER, COMMUNICATION IS POWER 297 (1973).
- Martin Luther King's Letter from Birmingham Jail, written in response to a
newspaper statement by eight fellow clergymen, was published in a number of periodi-
cals. See MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR. WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76-95 (1964); STEPHEN B.
OATES. LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, Jn. 222 (1982).
' TALKING BACK TO THE NEW YORK TIMES: LErrERS TO TIlE EDITOR 1851-1971 9 (Kal-
man Seigel ed., 1972) [hereinafter TALKING BACK]. Since few citizens pamphlet or attend
town meetings today, letters to the editor provide a forum for town meeting-like discus-
sions. In Kotlikoff v. Community News, 444 A.2d 1086 (N.J. 1982), the court found a
letter to the editor alleging that a city mayor might be "engaged in a huge cover up" for
failing to disclose property owners delinquent in their tax payments to be constitution-
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forum to engage in the "unfettered interchange of ideas."'
Letters to the editor have also been the subject of an in-
creasing number of libel lawsuits.6 More than one in ten newspa-
per editors report being sued in the past decade over a published
letter to the editor.7 A dramatic example of the modern letter to
the editor libel suit is Immuno AG v. J. Moor-Jankowski8 The
nine-year odyssey began in December, 1982 when an animal
rights advocate submitted to the editor of a small, scientific
journal a letter criticizing a multi-national corporation's plans to
use apes in hepatitis research in West Africa. The multi-national
corporation brought a libel action against the journal's editor for
publishing the letter to the editor. The Immuno case exemplifies
the need for the media to have an absolute privilege to reprint
letters to the editor.9 While most media libel defendants in such
cases ultimately win,10 current libel law encourages the media to
censor themselves and discourages them from publishing contro-
ally protected opinion because of the context of the accusations. Id. In so holding, the
court reasoned:
The pace and structure of the contemporary American scene are such that to-
day, public debate is seldom found in village squares and town meetings. One
of its few available outlets is the "letters to the editor" section of our newspa-
pers ... [,] one of the last remaining public forums. If letters of this sort were
defamatory, newspapers surely would be reluctant to continue publishing
strongly worded letters to the editor. We are loath to discourage that robust
and uninhibited commentary on public issues that is part of our national
heritage.
Id. at 1091-92.
1 New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
o See Ted Gest, A Chilling Flurry of Lawsuits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 23,
1988, at 64-65 (noting the growing trend of letter to the editor "intimidation suits"
against citizen-critics); Nat Hentoff, A Special Type of Expression-A Letter to the
Editor, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1990, at A21 (commenting on the increasing number of libel
suits arising out of letters to the editor).
7 Marc A. Franklin, Libel and Letters to the Editor: Toward an Open Forum, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 651, 656 (1986).
8 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991). New York Times colum-
nist Anthony Lewis would award the Immuno lawsuit the "prize in outrageousness."
Anthony Lewis, Abusing the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1991, at A31 (editorial).
9 An absolute privilege from legal action is a complete immunization of defendants
for statements made in certain defined circumstances, in this case as reprinters of letters
to the editor. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9.13[4][c], at 9-61
(1992); see infra notes 256-309 and accompanying text.
"0 Steve Pasternack, Editors and the Risk of Libel in Letters, 60 JOURNALISM Q. 311,
311 (1983) ("the vast majority of letter-generated libel suits result in summary judgment
or some other outcome favorable to the defendant publisher").
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versial letters to the editor by citizen-critics.
Part I of this Comment provides the background to the Im-
muno decision by examining letters to the editor and the First
Amendment functions served by them. In addition, this Com-
ment briefly reviews the evolution of defamation law and the
current legal treatment of letters to the editor under libel law. In
particular, under existing defamation law, the First Amendment
protection afforded letters to the editor is inadequate because
the terms and the corresponding legal tests are unclear and pro-
vide little judicial guidance. Part II reviews the Immuno facts as
well as the majority and concurring opinions which exemplify
the need for more First Amendment protection for letters to the
editor.
Part III of this Comment argues that the New York Court
of Appeals in Immuno stopped short in its analysis. While the
court reasoned that the allegedly libelous letter to the editor was
constitutionally protected, it failed to establish a broad privilege
to insulate newspapers and journals that reprint letters to the
editor from the First Amendment chill of current libel law. First,
current law, including Immuno, encourages the media to con-
tinue censoring themselves under the threat of prohibitive dam-
age awards and potential defense costs. Moreover, the media's
censorship of themselves as republishers is exacerbated by the
lack of newspaper competition and the limited access to remain-
ing newspapers. Second, similar privileges have been created
when the protection of free speech is deemed paramount; thus,
forging an absolute privilege for letters to the editor would be a
natural extension of existing protections. Specifically, the "fair
report privilege" is similar to that of an absolute privilege for
letters to the editor: when the media reprint letters to the editor
accurately, they cannot be held liable when the underlying let-
ters include false statements of fact. With adequate safeguards,
including that the letterwriters themselves remain liable, an ab-
solute privilege for the reprinters of letters to the editor can
function to stem the impetus for self-censorship, thus encourag-
ing the media to reprint controversial letters to the editor.
1993]
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I. BACKGROUND: LETTERS TO THE EDITOR, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND DEFAMATION LAW
A. Letters to the Editor
Today, the media assume three roles.11 First, the media are
"originators" when they report and investigate the news. Sec-
ond, the media act as commentators when they engage in criti-
cism. Finally, newspapers and journals play the part of "bulletin
boards" by transmitting the views of readers to other readers
through letters to the editor.12
Letters to the editor are written by non-reporters and re-
flect the opinions of individual citizen-critics only.13 Such letters
comment upon the publication's coverage, or lack thereof, and
provide readers an opportunity to "talk back." 4 A 1934 New
York Times editorial stated the following purpose of such let-
ters: "Letters to the editor are a valued part of every newspaper.
Their variety of topic is endless. They correct-and
make-errors. They reflect a multitude of views and moods.
They abound in curious information. They constitute a debating
society that never adjourns, in which everything knowable is
discovered.
'1 5
Newspapers published letters to the editor only sporadically
'1 Franklin, supra note 7, at 651.
it See Lois G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND
INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 180-81 (1987) (arguing that lia-
bility should be limited for the media that act as "bulletin boards").
13 See Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 557-58, 549 N.E.2d 129, 133,
549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 942 (1989); see also Robert Martin, Libel and Letters to the Editor, 9
QUEENS L.J. 188, 189 (1988) (letters to the editor are an expression of the writer's, not
the publication's, opinion). But see Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967 (Okla.
1977) (no authority to distinguish a newspaper's duty regarding a third party's letter to
the editor and an article written by a staff member).
" See JOHN L. HULTENG, THE OPINION FUNCTION: EDITORIAL AND INTERPRETIVE WRIT-
ING FOR THE NEWS MEDIA 149 (1973) (Letters to the editor represent a way to "talk back
to the information machines."); TALKING BACK, supra note 4, at 3 (Letters to the editor
"add up to an opportunity for a reader to 'talk back' to a paper ....").
" Irving Rosenthal,. Who Writes the "Letters to the Editor'?, in JOURNALISM: READ-
INGS IN THE MASS MEDIA 135, 142 (Allen & Linda Kirschner eds., 1971) (letters to the
editor are a way to measure a newspaper's effect on its readers). In 1896 thien in-coming
New York Times publisher Adolph S. Ochs announced that the paper's letters to the
editor section was to provide "a forum for the consideration of all questions of public
importance, and to that end to invite intelligent discussion from all shades of opinion."
TALKING BACK, supra note 4, at 3-4.
[Vol. 58:1439
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until the early twentieth century."6 The first known lawsuit in-
volving a letter to the editor occurred in 1798 under the Sedition
Act. Enacted soon after the 1791 ratification of the First
Amendment, the Sedition Act criminalized the publication of
false and malicious comments about the President or Congress.1"
Matthew Lyon, a Vermont Representative, wrote a letter to the
editor of a Vermont paper saying that President Adams was en-
gaged in "a continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst
for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation and selfish avarice."' 8
Lyon was charged with writing "scurrilous, feigned, false, scan-
dalous, seditious and malicious" words.'9 He was convicted, sen-
tenced to four months in prison and fined $1000.
The predecessors of letter writers were pamphleteers, indi-
viduals with "highly biased opinions," who succeeded in influ-
encing public opinion by distributing materials printed on their
own presses.2 In the eighteenth century letters from political
parties became a regular part of newspapers and were the most
influential news-opinion writings.2' At the same time, letters
written by citizens settling the West--"frontier correspon-
dents"-were often printed by eastern newspapers as articles.2
By the end of the nineteenth century letters from readers
began appearing more regularly in newspapers on a set editorial
page.23 The Great Depression and the rise of fascism in Europe
prompted a rise in the number of letters received, which in turn
provided the impetus for newspapers to establish a regular let-
ters to the editor section.24 Not until 1931 did the New York
Times establish the first permanent letters to the editor section
after printing such letters off and on since its inception in
11 Pamela M. Terrell, Letters Pages Flourish as Never Before, PHESsaE, Apr.
1989, at 6.




20 JIM A. HART. THE DEVELOPING VIEWS ON THE NEW& EDITORIAL SYNDROME 1500-
1800. at 198 (1970).
21 Id. at 200.
2 Steven R. Pasternack, Dear Editor. A Study of People Who Write Letters to the
Des Moines Register and Tribune 2 (1978) (unpublished M. Sci. thesis, Iowa State Uni-
versity). With the advent of the telegraph and wire services in the nineteenth century,
however, these correspondents gradually disappeared. Id. at 3.
2 Id. at 4.
2, Terrell, supra note 16, at 6; Pasternack, supra note 22, at 5.
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1851.25 Newspapers across the country followed suit.26
Another "boom" in letters was experienced by newspapers
in the 1970s, fueled by such issues as the Vietnam War, Water-
gate, abortion and gun control.27  Newspapers reported an
eighty-four percent increase in letters received in that decade.2 8
Moreover, many Americans read them.29
Today, letters to the editor are a distinct, important and
popular component of newspapers.30 Although more letters to
the editors are received by newspapers than ever before, the ac-
tual number of letters eligible for publishing is reduced after
newspapers "weed out" potentially libelous letters for fear of
lawsuits.3'
B. Letters to the Editor and the First Amendment
Letters to the editor embody and promote five competing,
yet often complementary, purposes of the First Amendment: (1)
the marketplace of ideas; (2) self-governance; (3) self-actualiza-
25 Pasternack, supra note 22, at 5; TALKING BACK, supra note 4, at 7. The New York
Times ran its first letter to the editor five days after its first issue appeared on Septem-
ber 18, 1851. Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 135.
26 Pasternack, supra note 22, at 6.
21 Terrell, supra note 16, at 6; see generally HULTENG, supra note 14, at 151.
26 Terrell, supra note 16, at 6. As newspapers began providing more space for letters
to the editor, readers expected more letters. Id.
29 Yet only one in ten Americans will write a letter to the editor. Pasternack, supra
note 22, at 23. The few studies attempting to determine who writes letters to the editor
are dated. A 1965 study found that letter writers in Kansas newspapers were elderly or
middle-aged, well-educated and male. HULTENG, supra note 14, at 151. A 1978 review of
the literature found that letter writers tended to be older, better educated, wealthier and
more conservative. Pasternack, supra note 22, at 14-17. Yet there is a distinction to be
drawn between those who write letters to the editor and those whose letters are selected
to be reprinted by the editors. Since "most of the 30 years of research on letters-to-the-
editor has been based on only those published, it may be that the profile which has
emerged reflects less the writers themselves than the selection of editors." HULTENc,
supra note 14, at 152, quoting David L. Grey & Trevor R. Brown, Letters to the Editor:
Hazy Recollections of Public Opinion, JOURNALISM Q., Autumn 1970, at 450-56, 471.
20 See HULTENG, supra note 14, at 152 (1973) (letters to the editor are one of the
"best-read" parts of the newspaper); ERNEST HYNDS, AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS IN TIlE 1970s
203 (1975) (letters to the editor columns are well-read); Lucy M. SALMON, THE NEwSPA-
PER AND THE HISTORIAN 57 (1976) (letters to the editor are among the most interesting
sections of any newspaper).
In a 1987 newspaper survey, 55% of all readers read letters to the editor, a higher
readership than the 51% reported for sports or the 46% readership for business. How-
ever, local news was read by 75% and national news was read by 72% of readers. Terrell,
supra note 16, at 7.
, See id. at 6 & 8.
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tion; (4) a safety-valve of discontent; and (5) a check on govern-
ment.32 Each purpose is promoted by the media when they pub-
lish letters to the editor.
First, letters to the editor embody the notion of the market-
place of ideas because through the exchange of letters to the edi-
tor truth will emerge. As Justice Holmes opined, "[T]he best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market."3 3 Despite much criticism of the
parallel drawn between the marketplace of economics with that
of ideas, 4 the United States Supreme Court and the New York
courts have reaffirmed this approach time and again as the First
Amendment's primary underlying purpose."s In essence, letters
to the editor help meet demand for public debate by supplying
32 Although there are conflicts among these five approaches, "[any adequate con-
ception of freedom of speech must [rely] upon several strands of theory in order to pro-
tect a rich variety of expressional modes." LAURENCE R TaiBs. A!miucAN CoNsrrru-
rIONAL LAw § 12-1, at 579 (1978).
'3 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (up-
holding the conviction of American socialists under the Espionage Act for their anti-war
leaflets attacking the United States's production and supply of arms to be used against
Russia).
The origins of this marketplace theory can be found in John Milton's Areopagitica,
written in opposition to England's licensing scheme: "Let [Truth] and Falsehood grap-
ple; who ever know Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" TioAs L.
TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1985) (quoting JoHN MLToN,
AREOPAGITICA. A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, To THE PARLmir
OF ENGLAND (1644)). Since truth is not always easily recognizable, all speech must be
presented to the public to determine its falsity or truth. TEDFORD, supra, at 18 (citing
JOHN S. MIL, ON LIBERTY (1859)). Mill reaffirmed the ideas of Milton and argued that
freedom of speech was needed because: (1) the censored opinion may be true and, con-
versely, the accepted opinion wrong; (2) even truth needs to be challenged; and (3) there
is, to some extent, truth in all opinions. Id.
3, See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 974-78 (1978) ([T]he marketplace concept is "implausible" because
(1) the notion assumes that people use rationality "to eliminate distortion caused by the
form and frequency of message presentation" and (2) the marketplace of ideas is domi-
nated by the powerful status quo.); JEROME A. BARRON. FREEoMl OF THE PRESs FOR
WHOM? (1973) (the market has failed); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (just as critics of laissez-faire economics demand
state intervention to correct market failure, such intervention is needed to correct the
communicative market failure because of media monopoly control and limited access to
the media by powerless or disfavored groups).
3' For Supreme Court cases, see, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 463 U.S.
364, 377-78 (1984); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 437 (1963). For New York cases, see, e.g., Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77
N.Y.2d 235, 255, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 917 (1991); Schermerhorn v.
Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 282-83, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 283 (2d Dep't 1980).
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ideas in the marketplace. When the marketplace is open, letter
writers compete with one another as merchants for the better
idea or "product." Thus, letters to the editor promote this spir-
ited competition under the First Amendment.
Second, letters to the editor promote self-governance .3  This
notion, closely associated with Professor Alexander Meiklejohn,
is premised upon the idea that the political process is similar to
a town meeting.3 7 The traditional self-governance concept pro-
tects expression used by citizens in the public deliberation pro-
cess only.38 As at a town meeting, citizens have the "right and
duty to think [their] own thoughts, to express them, and to lis-
ten to the arguments of others" to identify the community's gen-
eral welfare.3 9 In response to criticism of the traditional self-gov-
ernance notion,40 Meiklejohn provided a broader view of self-
governing speech to extend beyond electoral matters to those ex-
changes that contribute to the "continued building of our polit-
ics."' 41 This broader notion of politics includes education, philos-
ophy and the sciences, literature and the arts, and general
discussion of public issues concerning the common weal. 42 This,
3 Franklin, supra note 7, at 667-72; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)
("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.").
37 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOIHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 24 (1960); see TALKING BACK, supra note 4, at 9 (a letter to the editor is a
"town meeting in print").
38 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN. FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
25-27 (1948) (arguing that the First Amendment is absolute in its protection of political
discourse while providing only minimal protection to other speech).
31 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 37, at 24; see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 354, 375-76
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40 Some disagree with Professor Meiklejohn's distinction between political and non-
political expression. Zechariah Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV, 891, 899-900
(1949) (suggesting that "there are public aspects to practically every subject," including
art and literature). Others disagree with Meiklejohn's notion of politics as a town meet-
ing. See RONALD DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(1961) (arguing that the political process is not a town meeting in a system in which
private interests gain power at the expense of others).
41 City of Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
42 Alexander Meikeljohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
245, 255-57; see, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (none of
the Court's cases ever suggested that "expression about philosophical, social, artistic, ec-
onomic, literary, or ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion"); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("guarantees for speech and press are
not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those
are to healthy government").
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in turn, has generated other criticism.' 3 Ultimately, under either
the narrow or broad notion of self-governance, letters to the edi-
tor are today's "town meeting in print."' 44 Such letters inform
the electorate about who and what to vote for, educate the
elected about the opinions of voters and foster public discussion.
Letters to the editor are, therefore, a fundamental vehicle for an
expanded notion of representative democracy.
Third, letters to the editor promote the First Amendments
value of self-realization. Rejecting the distinction between politi-
cal and non-political speech inherent in the notion of self-gov-
ernance, self-realizing speech includes all speech based on the
implied value of individual worth that underlies democracy.'0
Letters to the editor allow individuals to express "the basic
human desire for recognition.'4 The letter writer's attempt to
persuade others is a basic form of self-realizing speech even
when the speaker has no real hope that the audience will be per-
suaded by the writer's viewpoint.47 Therefore, letters to the edi-
tor are, in and of themselves, vehicles for self-actualization.
Fourth, letters to the editor provide society with a "safety
valve" for discontent. The safety-valve rationale was articulated
by Justice Brandeis in his influential concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California:4 s
[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate means
unstable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
"'See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 26-28 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment should protect only "explic-
itly and predominately political" speech and that "freedom of non-political speech rests.
. upon the enlightenment of society and its elected representatives," not on the federal
Constitution).
" See TALKING BACK, supra note 4, at 9.
" See Baker, supra note 34, at 966; see also ZECHIAIAH CHAF . Fnar SPEcEC IN THE
UNITED STATES 33 (1948) (self-realization is a people's need "to express [its] opinions on
matters vital to [it] if life is to be worth living"); MELVILLE NIvMMER NIMwIER o. FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH § 1.03, at 1-49 (1984) ("[tlhe nature of man is such that he can realize
the fulfillment of self only if he is able to speak without restraint"). But see Bork, supra
note 43, at 25 (the self-actualization concept fails to "distinguish speech from any other
human activity"); Chafee, supra note 40, at 899-900; Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 604 (1982).
" See CHAFEE, supra note 45, at 33.
47 See SMoLLA, supra note 9, § 1.07[2], at 1-19.
48 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.4 9
This safety valve allows angered citizen-critics to voice their dis-
satisfaction through discussion rather than violence. s° Letters
provide a forum for individuals to voice criticisms and in doing
so, reduce the possibility of more harmful forms of expressive
discontent.
Lastly, letters to the editor are an important "check" on the
government. As Justice Black wrote, "The press serves and was
designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power
by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means
for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the
people .... ."51 The "checking value" of the First Amendment is
to expose government tyranny, thereby curbing its abuses. 2 Let-
ters to the editor are a vehicle for both the press and individual
citizens to fulfill their roles as watchdogs of governmental abuse
of power. On the transmitting end, letters to the editor provide
citizen-critics an opportunity to expose policies and programs to
public debate. On the receiving end, such letters allow the popu-
lace a forum to question authority.
Under all five of these First Amendment theories, letters to
the editor should be encouraged. Instead, current libel law dis-
courages the media from reprinting letters to the editor that
11 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also TALKING BACK,
supra note 4, at 3 (letters to the editor are "a safety valve through which the public's
capacity for indignation can find expression in a harmless, but useful way"); HULTN0,
supra note 14, at 149 ("the letters section is a safety valve").
90 But see NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988) (arguing that liberal
democracy serves only to legitinmate the dominance of the entrenched power structure by
creating an image of consensus through free speech that undermines real change).
" Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (striking down a state statute on First
Amendment grounds because it imposed criminal sanctions for publication of newspaper
editorials on election day urging people to vote a certain way).
2 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Aht. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 523, 542 (1977) ("[T]he role of the ordinary citizen is not so much to
contribute on a continuing basis to the formation of public policy [as in the marketplace
of ideas notion] as to retain a veto power to be employed when the decisions of officials
pass certain bounds."). But see Bork, supra note 43, at 25-26 ("It seems plain that deci-
sions involving only judgments of expediency are for the political branches and not for
the judiciary."); Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual
Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18 n.86
(1990) (arguing that Blasi's checking value of free speech rests upon questionable prem-
ises, including that: (1) individuals have access to meaningful channels of communica-
tions with wide dissemination; (2) the populace is willing to question authority; and (3)
there is a basis for evaluating the wisdom and propriety of governmental actions).
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carry any risk of a suit. By maintaining a multi-factor approach,
which is subject to various applications, to determine whether a
statement in a letter to the editor is libelous instead of employ-
ing a First Amendment analysis, the law impedes the realization
of First Amendment values.
C. Letters to the Editor and Defamation Law
Defamation law imposes liability for the publication of false
information that injures the reputation of another. Courts have
long recognized that every increase in the scope of protection of
the criticized individual under defamation law circumscribes
free debate and an informed polity under the First Amend-
ment.5 3 Generally, to establish whether a challenged statement is
libelous, a court determines whether the statement, which is "of
and concerning" the plaintiff, resulted in damage to a plaintiff's
reputation in a defendant's publication to third parties. Specifi-
cally, in determining whether a reprinter is responsible for an
allegedly libelous statement in letters to the editor, courts ana-
lyze a number of issues, such as whether the statement: (1) in-
volves fact or opinion; (2) is directed at a public figure, public
official or private figure as plaintiff; and (3) involves a matter of
public or private concern. These factors under current defama-
tion law fail to protect adequately the First Amendment func-
tions of letters to the editor since the legal balancing involves
analyzing amorphous terms and their correspondingly unclear
tests.
1. Pre-1964: Defamation Common Law
Historically, defamation law was part of state common law
and free expression was given very modest protection." The in-
dividual's right to protect his or her name was found to reflect
"no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and
worth of every human being .... The protection of private per-
sonality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the
11 See Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d. 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Floyd Abrams,
Why We Should Change the Libel Law, N.Y. TmsS, Sept. 29, 1985, (magazine) at 92
(arguing that the current balancing achieves the worst of two worlds because current
libel law does little to protect reputations and much to deter speech).
5 See SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 1.01, at 1-3.
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individual States."5 5 Generally, there was an almost irrebuttable
presumption of injury in any defamation action. Plaintiffs had
to establish only that the defendant was responsible for expres-
sing a derogatory statement that exposed the plaintiff to shame
and did not have to establish a reputational injury caused by the
defamatory statement.5 An allegedly defamatory statement was
actionable whether the statement was fact or opinion. 7 Further-
more, the plaintiff did not have to establish that the statement
was false or that the defendant knew of its falsity.58 The com-
mon law tradition provided adequate protection for neither the
person who originated an allegedly libelous statement nor the
defendant who accurately repeated the originator's defamatory
statement.5 Under the "republication doctrine," an accurate
repetition was no defense. A publisher could be held liable for
the subsequent republication of a defamatory statement by an-
other when it happened with the publisher's consent, either im-
plicit or explicit.60 This doctrine also created other defend-
ants-the media-to be sued by the injured party.
The privilege of "fair comment" was carved out of state def-
amation law to counterbalance the recognized burden libel
placed on public debate. The central purpose of the privilege
was to protect both "the right to comment on public affairs" and
"the public's access to important information. 6 1 Under the fair
"I Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Six purposes
have been delineated for the protection of reputation: (1) to maintain the "relational
interest" that an individual has in his personal esteem in the eyes of others; (2) to com-
pensate for economic injury; (3) to compensate for emotional injury; (4) to promote
human dignity; (5) to deter the publication of false and injurious speech; and (6) to
provide a check and balance on the media's great power by making them accountable.
SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 1.06[1]-[6], at 1-15 to -18.
56 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
11 See id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he defamed private citizen had to prove
only a false publication that would subject him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule."); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 565-67 cmt. a (1977).
" See SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 1.03[2], at 1-7 to 1-8.
Harris v. Minivielle, 19 So. 925, 928 (La. Ct. App. 1896) ("Talebearers are as bad
as talemakers.").
"' Robert D. Sack & Stuart D. Karle, Common Law Libel and the Press: A Primer,
in COMMUNICATIONS LAW, 1991, at 7, 30-34 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Lit-
erary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 323, 1991); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 578 (1977) ("[O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject
to liability as if he had originally published it"); see generally William H. Painter, Re-
publication Problems in the Law of Defamation, 47 VA. L. REV. 1131 (1961).
61 Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 556, 549 N.E.2d 129, 132, 549
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comment privilege, which is still in use today, a statement is
only privileged when it is a statement of opinion and public in-
terest, and not a misstatement of fact.2 The doctrine has four
elements. The published critical statement must: (1) concern a
matter of legitimate public interest; (2) be based on true or priv-
ileged facts set forth in the publication or known to the public;
(3) present the actual facts relied upon by the critic; and (4) not
be made for the sole purpose of causing harm. 3 The fair com-
ment privilege gave rise to the first distinction between fact and
opinion in American libel law, and highlighted the special pro-
tection afforded to matters involving public affairs. Notwith-
standing the fair comment privilege, courts held many letters to
the editor actionable under the pre-1964 defamation law.13
2. 1964: The Constitutionalization of Defamation Law in
New York Times v. Sullivan
In New York Times v. Sullivan"3 the United States Su-
preme Court first brought libel law within the scope of the First
Amendment. In Sullivan the police commissioner of Montgom-
ery, Alabama brought a libel action against the New York Times
N.Y.S.2d 938, 941 (1989). In New York the fair comment privilege dates back to 1840
with the libel suit against a journalist for his denunciation of a James Fenimore Cooper
book. Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend. 434 (1840).
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt a (1977); 1 FoWLER V HARPER &
FLEMING JAMES. JR.. LAW OF TORTS § 5.28, at 456 (1956); see infra notes 284-89 and
accompanying text.
63 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938). The Second Restatement notes that
section 606 has been omitted since "a statement of opinion that does not imply a defam-
atory statement of fact is no longer actionable and no privilege is needed." Id.
" See, e.g., Pfizinger v. Dubs, 64 F. 696 (7th Cir. 1894) (minister accused of being a
"rotten egg" in letter to editor wins); Hake v. Brames, 95 Ind. 161 (1883) (letter to editor
calling man a "liar" actionable); Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N.Y. 116 (1880) (letter to editor
accusing a public official of questionable awarding of paving contracts actionable). At the
same time, pre-1964 defendants in letters to the editors did sometimes win. See, e.g.,
Mosler v. Whelan, 147 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1958) (holding letter accusing a man of holding be-
liefs "alien to the American way" not actionable because it could not be interpreted as
labeling the man a Communist); Morey v. Barnes, 2 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1942) (finding
letter calling cafe a "brothel" not actionable since brothel did not neces sarily refer to
prostitution, but merely drinking and gambling); see generally Donald M. Zupanec, An-
notation, Defamation: Publication of "Letters to Editor" in Newspaper as Actionable,
99 A.L.R.3d 573 (1990) (reviewing cases that involve allegedly libelous letters to the
editor).
65 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see generally ANTHONY LEWIS. MAKE No Lxw THE. SuwivAN
CASE AND THE FiRST AMENDMENT (1991) (discussing the history of the Sullivan decision).
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and four Alabama clergy for a full-page advertisement taken out
to raise funds for the civil rights efforts of Martin Luther King,
Jr. Police Commissioner Sullivan argued the advertisement was
defamatory because it alleged police mistreatment of King and
protesting students, and was factually incorrect. The Court held
that the First Amendment prohibits a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory statement relating to his or her
official conduct unless the official proves that the statement was
made with actual malice. The Court defined actual malice as
"knowledge that [the statements] were false or reckless disre-
gard" by the defendant of the truth of his statements." The
Sullivan Court found that the proof of actual malice was not of
"convincing clarity," that the Times's failure to check the facts
in the allegedly defamatory advertisement did not constitute ac-
tual malice, and that the alleged attack on Sullivan was too ab-
stract to be found "of and concerning" him because he was not
identified by name. 7
The Sullivan Court reasoned that the First Amendment's
central meaning was the nation's "profound ... commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment. '6' Accordingly, the defamation law's requirement that
critics of official conduct guarantee the truth of their assertions
would not lead to free debate, but to self-censorship of both the
press and the "citizen-critic of government. '6 9 The Sullivan de-
cision established a "constitutional privilege for good faith crit-
ics of government officials. '70 In so doing, the Sullivan case rev-
376 U.S. at 279-80.
67 Id. at 285-91.
8 Id. at 270.
"' Id. at 279. The Sullivan Court said that state libel law's affirmative defense of
truth chilled the First Amendment. The Court asserted: "Under such a rule, would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticisms, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." Id. The Sullivan Court found
that Alabama's defamation law "dampen[ed] the vigor and limit[ed] the variety of public
debate." Id.
70 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 864 (2d ed. 1988).
At the same time, the Sullivan Court rejected the establishment of an absolute privilege
to protect newspapers from libel actions brought by public officials. 376 U.S. at 293
(Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); 376 U.S. at 297-305 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., con-
curring); LEWIS, supra note 65, at 118-20.
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olutionized defamation law by making it subject to the
constraints of the First Amendment. Under the Sullivan actual
malice test, then, a number of pre-1964 letters to the editor
would no longer be actionable.7 1
3. After 1964: Building on Sullivan
In the wake of Sullivan, the Supreme Court and lower
courts worked to refine the incorporation of libel law under the
First Amendment. The work most relevant to letters to the edi-
tor involves- determining whether an allegedly libelous statement
involves fact or opinion, is directed at a public figure, public offi-
cial or private figure as plaintiff, and involves a matter of public
concern.
a. Fact v. Opinion
The Sullivan decision merely suggested a constitutional dis-
tinction between fact and opinion by noting that "a defense of
fair comment must be afforded for honest expression of opinion
based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact. 1 7 2 At-
tempts to clarify the distinction between fact and opinion were
made in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.7 3 and Ollman v. Evans.7 4
The recent Supreme Court Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 70
decision has left this libel law landscape, including the judicial
distinction between fact and opinion, "essentially unchanged. '70
The Gertz Court reconsidered the fact versus opinion dis-
tinction in 1967. Gertz was a lawyer representing the family of a
murder victim in a lawsuit against a Chicago policeman. A John
Birch Society publication alleged that Gertz was a "Leninist"
and a "Communist fronter." The Gertz Court never addressed
whether the defendant's statements alleging the plaintiff was a
"Communist" was one of fact or opinion. Yet the Court alluded
71 See, e.g., Stanton v. Sentinel Printing Co., 84 N.E.2d 461 (Mass. 1949) (finding
letter accusing mayor of using his public employees to clear snow from his home
libelous); Scofield v. Milwaukee Free Press, 105 N.W. 227 (Wis. 1905) (holding letter
about former public official in a political campaign libelous).
7' 376 U.S. at 292 n.30.
3 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7- 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
479 U.S. 1 (1990).
76 Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 268, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1290, 566
N.Y.S.2d 906, 926 (1991) (Hancock, J., concurring).
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to the fair comment privilege's distinction between fact and
opinion by seeming to provide an absolute First Amendment im-
munity from defamation actions for all opinions.77 The Gertz
Court announced in dicta: "[U]nder the First Amendment there
is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. ' 78
Generally, courts understood this passage to mean that
statements characterized as opinions were constitutionally im-
mune from libel actions. Facts may be proven true or false.
However, "[a]n assertion that cannot be proved false cannot be
held libelous. A writer cannot be sued for simply expressing his
opinion of another person, however unreasonable the opinion or
vituperous the expressing of it may be."' 79 The Supreme Court
has cited the Gertz dicta approvingly for the proposition that
there is an absolute immunity for opinions on other occasions.80
This dicta also has been adopted by most circuits and many
state courts, including those of New York. 1
Nor was Gertz the only Supreme Court case to find opinions
protected by the First Amendment's shelter. Hyperbole, rhetoric
and satirical opinions are given strong protection by the Court.
In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bres-
See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (The "Gertz [Court]
elevated to constitutional principle the distinction between fact and opinion, which at
common law had formed the basis of the doctrine of fair comment."), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985). But see Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587 (Okla.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923, 925 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he problem of
defamatory opinion was not remotely an issue in Gertz and there is no evidence that the
Court was speaking with an awareness of the rich and complex history of the struggle of
the common law to deal with this problem.").
78 418 U.S. at 323, 339-40.
11 Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834
(1977).
11 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988); Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n
of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-84 (1974). But see Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) ("Thus we do not think this passage from Gertz...
create[d] a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labelled
opinion.").
"' See Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 380-81, 366 N.E.2d
1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). For a review of
other state and circuit courts that adopted the Gertz dicta, see SMOLLA, supra note 9,
§ 6.03[3], at 6-15 n.71.
(Vol. 58:1439
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AFTER IMMUNO
Ier82 the Court found the characterization of a developer's nego-
tiating tactics as "blackmail" to be constitutionally protected
because "even the most careless reader must have perceived that
the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole" and "vigorous
epithet."83 Again, in Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 4 decided the same day
as Gertz, the Court held that a newsletter that called a union
"scab" a "traitor" was protected without referring to Gertz. The
Court reasoned that "traitor" was used "in a loose, figurative
sense ... merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative
expression of the contempt felt by union members." 8 Similarly,
in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell8 the Court held that an
advertisement parody of conservative religious leader Jerry
Falwell was also constitutionally protected. The advertisement
suggested that Falwell had a "drunken incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse. 817 The Court found the state-
ment so unbelievable that it "could not reasonably have been
interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure
involved."8 "
In Ollman v. Evans"8 the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia translated the Gertz
fact-versus-opinion distinction into a "totality of circumstances"
test.90 The four-part test involved an examination of: (1) the
specificity of the statement; (2) its verifiability; (3) its literary
context; and (4) its public context. The issue in Ollman was
whether an editorial written by conservative columnists Row-
land Evans and Robert Novak labeling a professor a "dogmatic
Marxist lacking academic standing" was constitutionally pro-
82 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
11 Id. at 13-14.
81 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
" Id. at 284 & 286.
86 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
87 Id. at 48.
Id. at 50. The Court also rejected Falwell's action in tort for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
89 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
90 Other tests exist to determine whether a libelous statement is that of fact or opin-
ion. See, e.g., REsTATEtENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) ("[A] statement is actiona-
ble only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis of opin-
ion."); Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.




tected opinion. The en banc court held that the statements were
protected because of the immediate and broader social context
of the piece. As the Oilman majority waxed eloquent about the
context of the op-ed piece:
[W]e cannot forget that the public has an interest in receiving infor-
mation on issues of public importance even if the trustworthiness of
the information is not absolutely certain. The First Amendment is
served not only by articles and columns that purport to be definitive
but by those articles that, more modestly, raise questions and prompt
investigation or debate. By giving weight on the opinion side of the
scale to cautionary and interrogative language, courts provide greater
leeway to journalists and other writers and commentators in bringing
issues of public importance to the public's attention and scrutiny.9 1
The Olman test has been embraced by numerous circuit and
state courts, including those of New York, as an analytical
framework for applying the Gertz distinction between fact and
opinion to determine whether an allegedly libelous statement is
actionable.9 2
In 1990 the Supreme Court reexamined the fact versus
opinion distinction in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 9 3 While
many hailed Milkovich as the death of opinion protection under
91 750 F.2d at 983.
92 For examples of New York cases adopting Oilman, see, e.g., Steinhilber v. Al-
phonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 296, 501 N.E.2d 550, 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1986) (former
union member's defamation action against defendant dismissed because statement in
banner and taped telephone message referring to plaintiff as "scab" and lacking in talent
and ambition were protected opinion under Oilman); Parks v. Steinbrenner, 131 A.D.2d
60, 63-65, 520 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376-78 (1st Dep't 1987) (baseball umpire's defamation ac-
tion against major league baseball team owner for press releases in which owner criti-
cized umpire as incompetent and biased regarding certain calls were opinion under
Oilman). For a review of other state and circuit courts that have adopted the Oilman
totality of the circumstances test, see Sack & Karle, supra note 60, at 52-53, 55.
Accusations of criminal activity, however, even if in the form of opinion, are not
,protected in New York. See, e.g., Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 16, 449 N.E.2d 716,
720, 462 N.Y.S.2d 822, 826 ("[A]lthough expressions of opinion are constitutionally pro-
tected, accusations of criminal or illegal activity, even in the form of opinion, are not."),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d.
369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (libel suit by judge against journalist and pub-
lisher stemming from allegations that judge was "probably corrupt" and should be re-
moved from office did not support a defamation claim), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
For a review of the treatment of criminal charges in libel by different courts, see John B.
McCrory & Robert C. Bernius, Constitutional Privilege in Libel Law, in COMMUNICA-
TioNs LAW 1991, at 138-40 (Robert D. Sack & Stuart D. Karle eds., 1991) (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 323, 1991).
93 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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the First Amendment,14 the Milkovich Court did not radically
change, but merely retained, the existing federal opinion privi-
lege.95 In Milkovich a sports columnist allegedly defamed a high
school wrestling coach in his column by suggesting that the
coach had lied under oath in a judicial proceeding about a wres-
tling match altercation. The Milkovich Court reversed the Ohio
Supreme Court, holding that the columnist's "opinion" could be
interpreted by a reasonable factfinder as asserting a verifiable
fact.16 The Court found that the First Amendment did not pre-
clude a defamation action under Ohio law.
In reaching this outcome, the Court explicitly rejected the
well-established dicta of Gertz, arguing that Gertz was not
meant to be "a wholesale defamation exemption for anything
that might be labeled 'opinion'."9' 7 Yet the Court asserted that
such a separate privilege was not required because free expres-
sion was "adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine
without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion'
and fact."9 8 In so doing, the Court noted the First Amendment's
"vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public is-
sues" 99 as well as other "significant constitutional protections"'100
1, Is it Opinion or Is It Fact? Libel Ruling is a Huge Setback for Speech, L.k
Tmms, June 23, 1990, at B6 (editorial); Lewis R. Clayton, High Court: No Federal Privi-
lege for "Opinion" Found Defamatory, NAT'L L., Aug. 27, 1990, at 27 (suggesting that
the Milkovich decision "radically changed the direction of libel law"); see generally T.R.
Hager, Recent Developments, Mfilkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Lost Breathing
Space-Supreme Court Stifles Freedom of Expression by Eliminating First Amend-
ment Opinion Privilege, 65 TUL L. REv. 944 (1991) (arguing that the Milhovich Court
chipped away at the protection of opinions).
" Harvard Law Review Association, The Supreme Court 1939 Term: Leading
Cases, 104 HARv. L. Rav. 129, 223 (1990) (proposing that the Milhovich Court "simply
reformulated the opinion privilege"); Nat Stern, Defamation, Epistemology, and the
Erosion (but not Destruction) of the Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L RE%, 595, 613 (1990)
(arguing that the fact-opinion distinction is flawed and that Milkovich did not compel a
radical revision of this existing flawed doctrine); Si0LuA, supra note 9, § 6.01[2], at 6-4
to 6-5.
" 497 U.S. at 21-23. Some commentators have noted that the accusation of criminal
activity in Milkovich-perjury on the part of the coach-played an "unacknowledged"
role in the Milkovich Court's decision to find the allegedly libelous statements an im-
plied assertion of fact. McCrory & Bernius, supra note 92, at 138 (reviewing the treat-
ment of accusations of criminal activity).
", 497 U.S. at 18. The Milkovich Court stated that no Gertz.like "separate" federal
opinion privilege existed. Id. at 19.
"9 Id.
99 Id. at 22.
100 Id. at 15.
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and "established safeguards" 101 to avoid the "danger of media
self-censorship."I' 2 Accordingly, the Milkovich Court recognized
that a statement that cannot be interpreted reasonably as stat-
ing actual facts about an individual is protected.1 0 3 Thus, the
Court concluded that because of existing protections, an addi-
tional separate constitutional privilege for opinion was
unnecessary. 1°4
Justice Brennan's Milkovich dissent reaffirms that the ma-
jority opinion does not narrow existing federal opinion privi-
leges. As Justice Brennan wrote: "[W]hile the Court today dis-
pels any misimpression that there is a so-called opinion privilege
wholly in addition to the protections we have already found to
be guaranteed by the First Amendment, it determines that a
protection for statements of pure opinion is dictated by existing
First Amendment doctrine.' 105 The dissent observed that the
Court had simply restated the law that "lower courts have been
relying on for the past decade," that is, the Olman totality of
the circumstances approach."' 6 Justice Brennan disagreed only
with the majority's application of the analysis to the facts of
.Milkovich, finding the columnist's statements incapable of being
read as implying defamatory facts and therefore constitutionally
protected opinion.
In Milkovich the Court merely rephrased the constitutional
distinction of "fact" from "opinion" to "fact" and "non-fact."' 1 7
Yet the terms distinguishing fact from opinion embodied in
state defamation law remain relevant."' 8 While the terminology
is different at the federal level, the substance remains the same.
And so, after Milkovich, federal constitutional protections of
opinion continue, notwithstanding the understandable confusion
among lower courts."' 9 Therefore, the fact and opinion distinc-
'' Id. at 17.
102 Id. at 15.
103 Id. at 22.
104 "We are not persuaded that, in addition to these protections, an additional sepa-
rate constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment." Id. at 20.
10I Id. at 24 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
106 Id.
,oT SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 6.02[1], at 6-5, § 6.03[7][d][iii], at 6-16.12.
100 Id. § 6.01[2], at 6-4.1.
'o The confusion about Milkovich among lower courts is reflected by the spectrum
of Immuno opinions. See infra notes 202-220 and accompanying text. The Immuno ma-
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tion continues to be an important component in analyzing let-
ters to the editor.
b. Status of the Plaintiff
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts °10 a Saturday Evening
Post article accused university football coach Butts of "fixing" a
football game. In considering the matter, the 1967 Court ex-
tended the Sullivan actual malice standard established for pub-
lic officials to public figures. In 1974, however, the Court refused
to extend the Sullivan actual malice standard to private figures
in Gertz. The Gertz Court held that the plaintiff, an attorney,
was a private rather than public figure and therefore was not
bound by the Sullivan actual malice standard."' Consequently,
he had to prove only "that the statements at issue were negli-
gently made, since private figures lack the access that public
figures and public officials have to channels of communication.
12
jority interpreted Milkovich as ultimately narrowing the federal opinion privilege be-
cause a provable false fact will probably be actionable unless the situation involves loose,
hyperbolic language. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 245, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1275, 5C6 N.Y.S.2d 906, 911
(1991). Judge Hancock's concurrence argued that Milhoich left federal opinion protec-
tion "essentially unchanged." Id. at 268, 567 N.E.2d at 1290, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (Han-
cock, J., concurring). Judge Simons's concurring opinion also found the Immuno major-
ity's interpretation of Milhovich "far more constricted than the Supreme Court
intended." Id. at 257, 567 N.E.2d at 1283, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Simons, J., concurring).
For other New York courts confused by Milkovich, compare Zion v. Bensel, NY
L.J., Aug. 17, 1990, at 18 (Baer, J.) (The New York Supreme Court noted that Milhouich
"changed the landscape of the fact-opinion privilege area.") with Don King Prods., Inc.
v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (The "framework of privilege and
protections" in Milkovich is "considerably broader than might be imagined from a read-
ing of popular reports of the opinion privilege's demise."). For a review of the non-New
York lower courts' interpretation of Afilkovich, see McCrory & Bernius, supra note 92, at
121-30.
110 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
"I Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974); see supra notes 73-81
and accompanying text.
112 418 U.S. at 345. The Court's ruling allowed states to determine whether to apply
negligence, recklessness or knowing falsity as the standard in libel actions brought by
private figures but precluded the imposition of strict liability. Id. at 345-46. States re-
sponded with a number of approaches including negligence, actual malice and an inter-
mediate gross negligence standard in private figure cases. A majority of states--39-have
opted for some form of a negligence standard. SvoLLA, supra note 9, § 3.10, at 3-22 to
-27. Only four states have adopted the Sullivan actual malice standard in private figure
cases. Id. § 3.11, at 3-27 to -28. New York adopted a "gross irresponsibility" standard,
which is mid-way between the actual malice and negligence standards in private figure
cases. Id. § 3.12[1], at 3-28; Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 196,
199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
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Accordingly, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone113 the Court held
that a Time magazine article which published an account of the
divorce of an heir to the wealthy Firestone family, including
charges of adultery, was not constitutionally protected opinion.
In so doing, the Court held that the plaintiff was not a public
figure because her litigation was not voluntary. Therefore, the
determination of whether plaintiff is a public or private figure is
essential to determining which constitutional standard of protec-
tion is applicable in letter to the editor cases. With the extension
of the actual malice standard to public figures, some letter to the
editor cases pre-Curtis Publishing might turn out differently;
however, a court could still determine that a seemingly public
figure defendant is really a private figure under Gertz-
Firestone.14
c. Matters of Public Concern
Related to, yet distinct from, plaintiff's status is the state-
ment's subject matter. While the Sullivan Court suggested that
constitutional protection was needed to protect speech that mat-
ters,1" 5 the Supreme Court has since adopted, rejected and res-
urrected the use of the public concern criteria to determine
whether a statement is libelous."' In Rosenbloom v. Me-
.13 424 U.S. 448 (1976). The alleged falsehood was the statement that the divorce
was granted on the grounds of adultery. The article noted that "[t]he 17-month intermit-
tent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the
judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl'." Id. at 452.
14 For example, in De Meo v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 822, 263
N.Y.S.2d 244 (1965), the court held actionable letters critical of an officer of a local voter
association for his involvement in local school affairs. However, the plaintiff in De Meo
would seemingly be categorized as a public figure under Curtis Publishing. See also
Mosler v. Whelan, 147 A.2d 7 (N.J. 1958) (letter commenting on political philosophy of
local political leader found actionable).
"' 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
110 The matters of public concern test was first articulated in Pickering v. Board of
Education. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Pickering Court held that a letter to the editor
written by a government employee criticizing a school board's handling of its financing
was protected opinion because the employee-citizen was commenting upon a matter of
public concern which outweighed the interest of the government as employer in promot-
ing the efficiency of its public services. See generally Don Lewis, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, and Speech on
Matters of Public Concern: New Directions in First Amendment Defamation Law, 20
IND. L. REv. 767, 768 (1987) (asserting that recent Supreme Court cases have discarded
Gertz in First Amendment defamation law and reclaimed the test of whether the speech
at issue is of public concern).
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tromedia, Inc.17 the distributor of nudist magazines sued a ra-
dio company after he was arrested and subsequently acquitted
of selling allegedly obscene materials. The Court held that the
critical factor was not whether Rosenbloom was a public or pri-
vate figure, but whether his case implicated matters of "public
or general concern.""" As Justice Brennan opined:
We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is
embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional pro-
tection to all discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved
are famous or anonymous.... [W]e think the time has come forth-
rightly to announce that the determinant whether the First Amend-
ment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved
concerns an issue of public or general concern.110
In Rosenbloom the plurality opinion extended the Sullivan ac-
tual malice standard to private figures where the libelous state-
ment involved a matter of public or general interest.
While the Gertz Court viewed the subject-matter test of Ro-
senbloom as too "difficult" for lower courts to apply and the del-
egation of such power to lower courts unwise, 20 the public con-
cern factor has been resurrected by the Court in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps'2' and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 22 In Hepps a corporate stockholder
who franchised convenience stores sued a newspaper for defama-
tion based on articles claiming that the plaintiff was involved in
organized crime and had used his connections to get favors for
his business from state government officials. The Hepps Court
held that private figure plaintiffs bear the burden of proof as to
the falsity of a statement when a media defendant publishes a
defamatory statement involving speech of "public concern. '" 1
3
The Hepps Court found that although Hepps was a private fig-
ure, the challenged articles were on subjects of public concern
'2 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality).
118 Id. at 43-44. The radio reported the police action against Rosenbloom, labeling
him a "girlie book peddler" and part of the "smut literature racket." Id. at 34.
", Id.
,ll See 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
121 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
12 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
123 475 U.S. at 778.
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because they implicated "the legitimacy of the political
process."124
In Dun & Bradstreet2" a magazine published an erroneous
credit report which falsely stated that defendant Greenmoss had
filed for bankruptcy. The Court held that recovery by private
figures in defamation suits was allowable without a showing of
actual malice where the challenged speech was not of public con-
cern. To determine whether the statement was of public con-
cern, the Court looked to the statement's "content, form and
context.., as revealed by the whole record. ' 126 The Court found
that the credit report's "form and context" was not a public
matter because the report went to five subscribers only. Thus,
the Court concluded, the suit did not involve a matter of public
concern. In so doing, the Court reasoned that "matters of public
concern" are "at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion." 2 Numerous courts, including those of New York, have
adopted the subject-matter criteria. 128 Arguably, some letters
considered actionable before Rosenbloom-Hepps-Dun & Brad-
street would now be found to be protected opinion.
29
124 Id.
12' 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
121 Id. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
127 Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978), citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)).
18 In Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975), a newspaper reported plaintiff's arrest for possessing a danger-
ous drug and a hypodermic instrument. The Chapadeau court held that a plaintiff in a
libel action must establish gross irresponsibility on the part of the defendant where the
article concerned a matter of "legitimate public concern." Id. at 199. The Chapadeau
court found "the sphere of legitimate public concern" was "reasonably related to matters
warranting public exposition." Id. Similarly, in Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d
340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984), the former wife of a patient in a state
mental health facility brought an action against a newspaper for a series of articles which
stated that the wife's extramarital affairs exacerbated her husband's mental condition.
The Gaeta court held that the defamatory statements involved "at least arguably a mat-
ter of legitimate public interest" and thus were protected opinion. Id. at 350, 465 N.E.2d
at 806, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
19 For example, in Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N.Y. 116 (1880), a letter to the editor accus-
ing a public official of questionable practices in the awarding of paving contracts was
found actionable. The letter would probably not be found actionable under the Sullivan
actual malice standard. Additionally, the awarding of a paving city contract would most
likely not be found actionable under Rosen bloom-Hepps-Dun & Bradstreet because the
contracting process is arguably a matter of public concern.
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D. The Current Treatment of Letters to the Editor under Ex-
isting Defamation Law
Generally, courts consider three existing criteria-fact ver-
sus opinion, plaintiff status and matter of public concern-to
determine whether a letter to the editor is constitutionally pro-
tected opinion. Ultimately, most newspapers eventually win let-
ter to the editor libel suits under these existing criteria s0 In
part, this is because libel plaintiffs are often unable to establish
a defendant's actual malice under Sullivan.3 In part, this is be-
cause "[m]ost letters written to newspapers ... deal with public
persons and public issues" under Curtis Publishing and the Ro-
senbloom-Hepps-Dun & Bradstreet cases. 3 2 Nevertheless, the
vagueness of existing libel legal tests and their uncertain judicial
characterization also discourage the media from reprinting such
letters.
1. The Fact-Opinion Distinction
The Olman distinction between fact and opinion, which re-
mains viable after Milkovich, provides little guidance in analyz-
... In a survey of 27 post-1964 libel cases against newspapers for their publication of
letters to the editor, only one plaintiff ultimately received money. Franldin, supra note 7,
at 658-59.
131 Id. at 656-57; see, e.g., Pasculli v. Jersey Journal, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2575
(1982) (under actual malice standard, newspaper's failure to check letter accusing a state
assemblyman of living off public taxes was non-libelous), cert. denied, 446 A.2d 152 (N.J.
1982); Sparks v. Boone, 560 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (under actual malice stan-
dard, action by former state university president who was running for state senate failed
against letter writer criticizing his presidency); LaPrade v. H.S. Gere & Sons, Inc., 360
N.E.2d 915 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (under actual malice standard, candidate for town
moderator failed in an action against newspaper for printing a letter from his opponent
attacking the candidate as a public figure).
But see Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093 (Okla. 1978) (under actual malice standard,
letter actionable in rebutting prior letters written by plaintiff about utility rate contro-
versy because defendant letter writer used information from security officials). Compare
Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1977) (under actual malice standard,
letter criticizing the county sheriff candidate for his performance during his prior term as
sheriff published in the final edition of defendants' newspaper actionable because the
newspaper failed to inquire about the letter writer or letter and one of the newspaper
defendants was related by marriage to the plaintiff candidate's opponent), oith Shiver v.
Apalachee Publishing Co., 425 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (under actual mal-
ice standard, letter published one day before election criticizing candidate who was the
former officeholder not defamatory because it constituted opinion even though candidate
lost election).
132 See Pasternack, supra note 10, at 312.
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ing a letter to the editor. The distinction between the fact and
opinion is, "at best, one of degree";' at worst, the words be-
come merely "familiar terms in to which one can pour whatever
meaning is desired."'34 The vagueness of the distinction is well-
established.13 5 As some commentators have noted, "All state-
ments in language are statements of opinion, i.e., statements of
mental processes or perceptions. So-called 'statements of fact'
are only more specific statements of opinion. 13' Requiring a dis-
tinction between "the various shades of fact/opinion" is "inevi-
tably arbitrary.' 3 7 Accordingly, an editorial has been granted
constitutional protection, in part, because of thb tenuous distinc-
tion between fact and opinion. 38 Therefore, under Olman, a
court's ability to label a statement fact or opinion leads to un-
certain judicial characterization of letters to the editor. As one
judge noted, since "[b]eauty is in the eye of the beholder ... it
would appear that the result to be obtained through application
of the Olman factors is in the eye of the judge.'
39
Different courts characterize similar allegedly libelous state-
ments differently. On the one hand, in Kotlikoff v. Community
News14 0 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a letter to
the editor criticizing the mayor and town tax collector for engag-
'13 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988).
13, See Herbert W. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A
Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (1962).
"35 See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Courts trying to
find one formula to separate 'fact' from 'opinion'... are engaged in a snipe hunt."), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("many statements . . . do not clearly fit into either category"); id. at 994 (Bork, J.,
concurring) (While judges will articulate "such things as four-factor frameworks, three-
pronged tests, and two-tiered analyses in an effort, laudable by and large, to bring order
to a universe of unruly happenings and to give guidance for the future.., life will bring
up cases whose facts simply cannot be handled by purely verbal formulas, or at least not
handled with any sophistication and feeling for the underlying values at stake."), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
131 W. KING & D. PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 4 (1942), quoted in 3
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 701[01], at 701-06
(1988).
17 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 154 (1988).
138 See Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711, 714 (Alaska 1966) (libel
action by newspaper columnist against defendant who wrote newspaper editorial calling
plaintiff columnist a "garbage man" and his column "garbage" failed because statement
was constitutionally protected opinion).
" Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1307 (8th Cir.) (Bowman, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
140 444 A.2d 1086 (N.J. 1982).
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ing in a "cover up" leading to a decline in property tax revenues
was constitutionally protected opinion. The Kotlikoff court char-
acterized "cover up" and "conspiracy" not as specific accusa-
tions of criminal activity, but rather as rhetoric. 41 On the other
hand, in Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston 42 the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that a chapter of a book highly critical of
a judge's performance-entitled "The Ten Worst Judges in New
York"-which charged that a judge was "probably corrupt" and
"suspiciously lenient" was not found to be protected expression.
Similarly, different courts identify the same challenged
statement in one case in opposite ways. In Immuno AG v. Moor-
Jankowski'43 a New York supreme court viewed a letter to the
editor that attacked a corporation's proposed plan to research
hepatitis using captured wild chimpanzees as factual. The court
found that the "defendant was making factual charges disparag-
ing plaintiff's scientific activities.... It would be playing a game
of semantics to endow these factual charges with the cloak of
opinion. "144 However, the appellate division in Immuno found
the challenged statements in the letter to the editor to be opin-
ion. The court reasoned that it was "plain" that the challenged
letter's "ultimate objective was to express certain opinions" even
though it "did contain some assertions of a factual sort.'
4
Indeed, in one case the Ohio Supreme Court managed to
characterize differently the same allegedly defamatory state-
ment. In Milkovich v. News-Herald14 6 the court held that a
sports columnist's statement that "anyone who attended the
[event] knows in his heart that [plaintiff] lied at the hearing af-
ter.., having given his solemn oath to tell the truth" was fac-
tual.14 7 The court found the statements "not constitutionally
protected as the opinions of the writer" because "[t]he plain im-
port of the author's assertions is that Milkovich ... committed
141 "Taken as a whole the letter could not reasonably be interpreted as charging the
plaintiff with committing a criminal offense." 444 A.2d at 1091.
.1 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977).
143 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1821 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1987).
4" Id. at 1825.
1'5 Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 145 A.D.2d 114, 122, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134 (1st
Dep't 1989).
146 473 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
"; 473 N.E.2d at 1192.
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the crime of perjury in a court of law."' 48 Two years later the
same court, with a different membership, declared that the chal-
lenged statement was opinion in Scott v. News-Herald.14 Under
the Olman four-factor test, the court reasoned that the state-
ment was opinion partly because of the column's caption and
the article's placement on a sports page.
A court's emphasis on specific factors of the Olman test
tends to determine the outcome of the case.' Like the formula
used to transform Dr. Jekyll into Mr. Hyde, the Olman test can
be used to transform opinion to fact and vice-versa.'" A court
that emphasizes contextual factors (literary and social) is more
likely to find letters to the editor an easily recognizable literary
genre by "the average reader" and therefore constitutionally
protected opinion.152 Accordingly, courts rely on the ability of
148 Id. at 1197.
149 496 N.E.2d 699, 706-07 (Ohio 1986).
150 Rodney W. Ott, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative
Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 764, 781 (1990) (arguing that the context in
which a statement appears determines whether it is constitutionally protected opinion).
1 See Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 716 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (The Ollman test is
"used to complete the Jekyll and Hyde transformation of [the sports column] from fact
to opinion.").
182 See generally Ott, supra note 150, at 781. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.,
881 F.2d 1426, 1432-33 (8th Cir. 1989) (literary context signals the average reader to
expect either opinion or fact while social context shapes the ways in which statements
are understood), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Hay v. Independent Newspapers,
450 So. 2d 293, 295-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (letter criticizing a state prosecutor's
intentions regarding the prosecution of plaintiff was found to be constitutionally pro-
tected because of its editorial context); Kotlikoff v. Community News, 444 A.2d 1086,
1092 (N.J. 1982) (allegation of mayoral property tax cover-up in a letter to the editor was
opinion because of the "public forum"); Epstein v. Board of Trustees of Dowling College,
152 A.D.2d 534, 536, 543 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (1989) (letter written by student criticizing a
professor's teaching in a student newspaper was held constitutionally protected because
of the "broader social context"); Seldon v. Shanken, 143 A.D.2d 3, 5, 531 N.Y.S.2d 264,
266 (1988) (letters criticizing a competing newspaper's wine expert and his magazine's
policies were found constitutionally protected because of their "context"); Pollnow v.
Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 10, 16, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (1985) (letter to
the editor criticizing a police investigation and grand jury proceeding regarding a rape
victim-the daughter of the letter writer-were found constitutionally protected opinion
because, in part, of the letter's "medium"), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 778, 492 N.E.2d 125, 501
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1986).
For a critique of the Ollman approach, specifically the overinclusiveness of the con-
textual prongs of the test, see Jeffrey E. Thomas, Statements of Fact and Opinion, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1040-56 (1986) (arguing that the totality of the circumstances test is
inconsistent with the First Amendment because it relies on the persuasiveness of the
speech in deciding whether the statement should be protected and is unpredictable and
costly).
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the average reader to protect the literary and social contexts of
opinion in magazine articles,1 53 opinion-editorials,'" sports col-
umns, 155 restaurant reviews ' and satire. 1 7 A court's use of con-
textual analysis tends to emphasize the underlying First Amend-
ment purposes of the literary genre, although the distinction
remains unpredictable, depending on the judicial characteriza-
tion of the text and the text's persuasiveness. ' On the other
hand, a court that stresses the first two factors of the Olman
test (precision and verifiability) will generally find an allegedly
libelous statement unprotected opinion, with the literary and so-
cial factors used as "exculpatory factor[s]" only. 0 In conclusion,
153 See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (a
Newsweek magazine article is allowed a "freer style" and the reader is signalled when
the piece is "transparently one-sided"), rev'g in part, 759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Pring v. Penthouse, Inc., 695 F.2d 438, 441 (10th Cir. 1982)
(insinuation that plaintiff committed sex acts during Miss America contest on stage not
libelous because writing was a "fantasy"), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
'54 See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (an "op-
ed" piece is presumed to be one of opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); National
Rifle Ass'n v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1299, 1301, 1314 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(statement alleging that the National Rifle Association "happily encourages... murders
and robberies" was protected opinion because it appeared on the editorial page); Loeb v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 486-88 (D. Mass. 1980) (article criticizing pub-
lisher of competing newspaper protected opinion because on editorial page). But see Mc-
Hale v. Lake Charles American Press, 390 So. 2d 556, 560 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (editorial
that no bond buyer "would buy a nickel's worth of securities" on the city attorney's
opinion where earlier editorial stated that he had reaped thousands of dollars in fees was
actionable), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
15' See, e.g., Henderson v. Times Mirror Co., 669 F. Supp. 356, 360 (D. Colo. 1987)
(article criticizing professional football players' agent by calling him a "sleaze-bag" who
"slimed up from the bayou" protected opinion as sports news), ofrd, 876 F.2d 108 (10th
Cir. 1989); Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ohio 1986) (sports columns are
often "a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole").
'" See, e.g., Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 227 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("The natural function of the review is to convey the critic's opinion of the
restaurant reviewed."); Greer v. Columbus Monthly Publishing Corp., 448 N.E.2d 157,
161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) ("[A]n article commenting upon the quality of a restaurant or
its food, like a review of a play or a movie, constitutes the opinion of the reviewer.").
'57 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (a satirical adver-
tisement portraying the Reverend Jerry Falwell as a drunk who had sex with his mother
was a "parody"); see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
118 See Thomas, supra note 152, at 1040-56.
195 tt, supra note 150, at 781; see, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
21-22 (1990) (the specificity and verifiability of the words in a sports column made it
fact, not opinion); Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 877 F.2d
1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir 1989) (company brought action against a television reporter for
announcing South African involvement in supplying weapons to the Nicaraguan contras);
Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1248-51 (8th Cir.) (former marine officer who worked as
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the emphasis on the fact-opinion distinction, in general, and the
Olman test, in particular, undermines the goal of robust debate
under the First Amendment that is promoted by letters to the
editor.
2. Matters of Public Concern
Like the fact-opinion distinction, the "matters of public
concern" concept is problematic: its definition is unclear.160 As
Justice Marshall noted, "[A]ll human events are arguably within
the area of 'public or general concern'." 161 Only skimpy interpre-
tations of the public concern test exist. The Court has noted
that all Supreme Court decisions before 1985 involved matters
of public concern.162 The Court has also defined "matters of
public concern" as those where free expression "is essential to
the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a
whole, 16 3 and as that "information [which] is needed or appro-
priate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigen-
cies of their period," including statements of "truth, science,
morality, and arts in general.' 64 Moreover, whatever the defini-
tion of matters of public concern adopted, its application raises
the specter of regulating speech according to its content, a pro-
hibited exercise under the First Amendment.'6"
a personnel manager for a senator brought libel action against senatorial candidate chal-
lenging his employer for false allegations in press releases during the campaign), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989).
160 See Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 726 (11th Cir. 1988); Stephen Allred, From
Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64
IND. L.J. 43 (1988).
"I Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent.
ing); see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
162 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985); see
supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
103 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04
(1984).
164 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
165 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The
Perils of An Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990) (ar-
guing that the matters of public concern criteria comprise a content-based threshold test
that undermines the First Amendment, threatening the very language the test seeks to
protect and raising the specter of impermissible content regulation). In addition, Estlund
notes that only speech that is "closely tied" to the political process has thus far survived
the Court's public concern test. Id. at 35; see also Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defend-
ants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion
in Defamation Law, 49 U. PiT. L. REV. 91 (1987) (reasoning that the notion of public
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Generally, courts analyze letters to the editor as involving
"matters of public concern" together with the letter's literary
genre to deem them constitutionally protected.0 0 In a few cases,
however, courts rely on the matters of public concern approach
only.167 In other words, the public concern test provides little
help in determining whether a letter to the editor should be pro-
tected opinion. This is especially true since, to some extent, the
very publication of a letter to the editor transforms its content
into a matter of public concern. Few newspapers or journals
would publish a letter that did not have an impact on the social
and political climate for fear of jeopardizing their reputation. As
the Court explained, the media themselves define what consti-
tutes matters of public concern:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment
of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has
yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
concern is incompatible with the very democratic self-governance it seeks to facilitate
since it excludes speech from public discourse).
166 See, e.g., Okun v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 629 P.2d 1369, 1379 (Cal.)
(letter criticizing a real estate developer's condominium plans as well as the city council
was protected because, in part, of the "context" of public debate), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1099 (1981); Desert Sun Publishing Co. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 158 Cal. Rptr.
519, 521 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) (letter criticizing a hospital board of directors' candidate
was protected because of the political context); Sail v. Barber, 782 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989) (letter criticizing reported ethnic harassment was protected because of
the "context" of the letter to the editor and the on-going controversy); Della-Donna v.
Yardley, 512 So. 2d 294, 296 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1987) (letter criticizing a local univer-
sity's attorney was protected because of its "context" as a letter to the editor and be-
cause it was a component of an on-going public debate); Alleman v. Vermilion Publishing
Corp., 316 So. 2d 837, 840 (La. CL App. 1975) (letter attacking a doctor for declining to
treat a child taken to a hospital emergency room was protected as a matter of public
concern).
M6 See, e.g., Reddick v. Craig, 719 P.2d 340, 341 (Colo. CL App. 1985) (letter against
county landowners association chair and newspaper by land.use planning company and
its chief operating officer was not libelous because letter addressed matter of public con-
cern); Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029, 1036 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1985) (letter
criticizing real estate developers for having "duped" the town regarding the value of for-
mer school property was protected because it dealt with a public issue); Safarets, Inc. v.
Gannett Co., 80 Misc. 2d 109, 113, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280-81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (letter
to the editor criticizing the treatment of animals and birds by animal store was protected
opinion because it was a subject of general public concern), oI'd, 49 A.D.2d 666, 373
N.Y.S.2d 858 (3d Dep't 1975).
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process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of a free press as they have evolved to this time. 8
The distinction between matters of public and private concern is
similarly circular in New York where the media determines
whether a topic is a "legitimate matter of public concern." 1 9
3. Plaintiff's Status
Like the fuzziness of the matters of public concern ap-
proach, the distinction between public and private figures is also
unclear. Distinguishing between public and private figures has
been described by one judge as akin to "trying to nail a jellyfish
to the wall. 17 0 While the Gertz Court rejected the Rosenbloom
matters of public concern test, the majority defined "public
figures" as, to some degree, dependent on the existence of a pub-
lic controversy. 7 1 The parameters of who qualifies as a public
168 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
168 See supra note 128. In New York the Gaeta court's reasoning reflects that of the
Court in Miami Herald Publishing: "The press, acting responsibly, and not the courts
must make the ad hoc decisions as to what are matters of genuine public concern, and
while subject to review, editorial judgments as to news content will not be second-
guessed so long as they are sustainable." 62 N.Y.2d 340, 349, 465 N.E.2d 802, 805, 477
N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (1984); see also Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., 74 N.Y.2d 586, 595, 549
N.E.2d 453, 457, 550 N.Y.S.2d 251, 255 (distinguishing "legitimate public concern" from
"the realm of mere gossip and prurient interest ... is best left to the judgment of jour-
nalists and editors, which we will not second-guess absent clear abuse"), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 930 (1980).
The parameters of a "legitimate matter of public concern" in New York remain un-
clear. New York courts have found a number of topics of public concern. See, e.g.,
Friedan v. Friedan, 414 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (a past relationship with a feminist);
Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d 557, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980)
(drug use); Twenty-Five East 40th Street Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d
595, 282 N.E.2d 118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972) (the quality of food in a restaurant);
D'Agrosa v. Newsday, Inc., 158 A.D.2d 229, 558 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1990) (a "miracle baby"
malpractice suit).
1o Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976),
afl'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
162-63 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (The difference between public and private
figures has "no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy."); Anthony Lewis, New
York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 624 (1983) (in determining whether a state-
ment is libelous, judges should not rely "on the abstract definition of 'public figure' ").
1I Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). While the Gertz Court explicitly rejected the
subject-matter test, the Court and lower courts arguably employ the matters of public
concern analysis because to determine whether a plaintiff is a public figure often involves
determining whether the party is involved in a "public controversy." See Harris v.
Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687, 698 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (defining Gertz public figure test as circu-
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figure are fluid. Neither a well-known private attorney nor a
socially prominent family member involved in a notorious di-
vorce qualified as a public figure.173
The test, however, is less applicable to letters to the editors
in part because letters selected by newspapers and journals tend
to involve public figures or public officials who have mass ap-
peal. In addition, the very publication of a letter often trans-
forms a plaintiff into a public figure.17 4 The range of plaintiffs
deemed public figures in letters to the editor cases include: a
developer involved in city water wells and treatment plants;17 5 a
citizen engaged in a utility-rate debate;176 and chiropractors who
appeared on a television show.
177
In the end, these three legal considerations-whether a
statement is fact or opinion, whether it involves a matter of pub-
lic concern, and whether a statement involves a public fig-
ure-are merely "shorthand for the determination that the prin-
ciples embodied in the first amendment.., would be vindicated
by forbidding the defamation suit to proceed."17 8 These existing
lar because it requires a court to define "public" figure by referring to "public contro-
versy"). For example, the Firestone Court found a socially prominent divorcee not a
public figure because the "[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceeding is not
the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 454 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
As Justice Marshall noted, "Having thus rejected the appropriateness of judicial inquiry
to 'the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject,' ... Gertz obviously did not
intend to sanction any such inquiry by its use of the term 'public controversy.' Yet that
is precisely how I understand the Court's opinion to interpret Gertz." Id. at 488.
172 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323; see Hotchner v. Castiflo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1044
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[I]f attorney Gertz was not a public figure, nobody is.").
17' Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
" See Pasternack, supra note 10, at 312 ("ILlibel plaintiffs suing for libel regarding
a letter to the editor have constitutionally been adjudged public persons.").
IlOkun v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 629 P.2d 1369 (Cal.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1099 (1981).
1' Wright v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093 (Okla. 1978).
"' Cera v. Mulligan, 79 Misc. 2d 400, 358 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. CL Monroe County),
afi'd, 47 A.D.2d 798, 367 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (4th Dep't 1975). Notwithstanding the classifica-
tion of a plaintiff as a public figure, however, some plaintiffs do prevail in letters to the
editor cases. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Maurer, 204 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. CL App. 1974) (letter
found libelous that accused mayor of using his public status for personal profit); Wright
v. Haas, 586 P.2d 1093 (Okla. 1978) (published reply letter by a city attorney in a univer-
sity newspaper that attacked the "radical" political views and questioned the motiva-
tions of a member of a civic organization found libelous); Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian,
569 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1977) (letter that accused political candidate of embezzling funds
printed in final paper before election found libelous).
178 Stern, supra note 95, at 613.
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
legal tests and their applications discourage the media from re-
printing more controversial letters to the editor. Therefore, an
absolute privilege for such reprinters would encourage more di-
rect, robust debate, notwithstanding that most newspapers even-
tually win letter to the editor libel cases brought against them.
In New York the most recent case exemplifying the need for an
absolute privilege for letters to the editor is Immuno AG v.
Moor-Jankowski.
179
II. IMMUNO AG v. MOOR-JANKOWSKI
A. Facts
In 1982 defendant Moor-Jankowski,' the unpaid editor-in-
chief of the Journal of Medical Primatology,18' received a letter
to the editor criticizing the plaintiff Immuno AG ("Immuno"), a
multinational corporation,18 2 for its plans to establish a West
African hepatitis research facility where experiments would be
conducted on captured chimpanzees. The letter was written by
Dr. Shirley McGreal, Chair of the International Primate Protec-
tion League ("IPPL"), an advocacy organization aimed at pro-
tecting primates involved in biomedical research. 183 The letter
criticized Immuno's research facility proposal because it: (1) cir-
cumvented international policies protecting chimpanzees as an
endangered species; (2) had the potential to eliminate the wild
chimpanzee population because the capture of wild chimpanzees
involved the killing of their mothers; and (3) involved returning
experimental animals to the wild, which created the danger of
spreading hepatitis to other chimpanzees.
Moor-Jankowski contacted Immuno regarding the receipt of
19 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261
(1991).
18I Dr. Moor-Jankowski is a professor of medical research at New York University
School of Medicine and director of the Laboratory for Experimental Medicine and Sur-
gery in Primates of New York University Medical Center. 77 N.Y.2d at 240, 567 N.E.2d
at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
81 The Journal reports on primate research in academia and has a circulation of
300. Gest, supra note 6, at 64.
'82 Immuno AG is an Austrian multinational corporation that manufactures biologi-
cal products from blood and operates in approximately 30 countries. Nat Hentoff, The
Quicksands of Libel, WASH. PosT, Apr. 1, 1989, at A23.
.83 77 N.Y.2d at 240, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
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McGreal's letter.8'8 While the plaintiffs admitted receipt of the
letter and offered no comment, Immuno's attorneys wrote to the
defendant challenging the accuracy of the letter. The defendant
responded by extending the deadline for plaintiffs reply by two
months and indicated that the plaintiff should obtain the docu-
mentation from McGreal directly.
The letter to the editor was published almost a year after its
receipt. Moor-Jankowski wrote an editorial note prefacing Mc-
Greal's letter, identifying the author and explaining that the let-
ter had been held for nearly a year, yet Immuno had failed to
comment."8 5
Also at issue between Immuno and Moor-Jankowski was the
latter's comments in a scientific magazine before the publication
of McGreal's letter in the Journal. In a New Scientist article,
Moor-Jankowski was quoted as saying that: (1) there was an ad-
equate supply of chimpanzees for research without capturing
new ones; (2) Immuno's efforts to capture wild chimpanzees was
"scientific imperialism"; and (3) Immuno's attempts to capture
wild chimpanzees would jeopardize "people like me involved in
the bona fide use of chimpanzees" for research. 8"
B. Procedure
In December, 1984 Immuno sued Moor-Jankowski and
seven other defendants in New York supreme court for the al-
legedly libelous letter to the editor authored by McGreal and for
Moor-Jankowski's statements in New Scientist.'817 Immuno
claimed four million dollars in damages. 88 By 1991 all defend-
ants except Moor-Jankowski had settled with plaintiff for "sub-
stantial sums" of money. 89
After "extensive discovery," Moor-Jankowski moved for
"' Id. at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1272, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
' Id.
186 Id., 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09.
Id., 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The seven other defendants in-
cluded McGreal and the publishers and distributors of the Journal of Medical Pd-
matology and New Scientist magazine.
'" Lewis, supra note 8, at A31.
289 77 N.Y.2d at 241, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The appellate divi-
sion commented that Immuno "succeeded in coercing" substantial settlements out of the
defendants "for the obvious reason that the costs of continuing to defend the action were
prohibitive." 145 A.D.2d 114, 128, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129, 138 (lst Dep't 1989).
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summary judgment to dismiss the libel action.190 In August, 1987
the New York supreme court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment, finding that the statements in the letter to
the editor were factual and therefore triable as to whether de-
fendant acted with actual malice in either making or publishing
the statements. However, the court did dismiss the prima facie
tort action against Moor-Jankowski for his statements in New
Scientist.19'
Moor-Jankowski appealed and in January, 1989 the appel-
late division reversed the supreme court.192 The court granted
summary judgment and dismissed the suit, finding "that the
statements contained in the letter and New Scientist article
[we]re not actionable and that the defendant [wa]s entitled to
summary judgment dismissing the complaint. 19 3 The court
identified the bulk of the letter as that of opinion. As to the
"underlying factual propositions" upon which the author elabo-
rated with opinion, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to
meet its burden of proving those statements false.19 4 The court
recognized that the "common expectation of a letter to the edi-
tor is not that it will serve as a vehicle for the rigorous and com-
prehensive presentation of factual matter but as one principally
for the expression of individual opinion.'
9 5
The New York Court of Appeals then granted Immuno's re-
quest for leave to appeal.9 6 In December, 1989 the court af-
firmed the appellate division's dismissal of plaintiff's libel ac-
,90 77 N.Y.2d at 242, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909. Immuno's status as a
public figure was raised, but not directly addressed in the New York supreme court opin-
ion. Immuno, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
"' Prima facie tort is the infliction of intentional harm that results in damage with
neither excuse nor justification, through an act or acts that would otherwise be lawful.
ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 1232, 398 N.Y.S.2d
864, 866 (1977). To establish the tort, a plaintiff must prove special damages. Curiano v.
Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 469 N.E.2d 1324, 480 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1984). The court held that
Immuno failed to specify the special damages with sufficient particularity. Therefore, it
granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the plaintiff's cause of
action for prima facie tort. Immuno, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1827.
192 Immuno, 145 A.D.2d 114, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1989).
Id. at 121, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
19' Id. Indeed, the court found most of the factual assertions in the publications to
be "demonstrably true" or, at least, "insusceptible of being proved false." Id. at 130, 537
N.Y.S.2d at 139.
195 Id. at 129, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
-96 74 N.Y.2d 602, 539 N.E.2d 1113, 541 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989).
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tion.197 It held that the challenged items were constitutionally
privileged opinion under both the state and federal free speech
guarantees, and that no triable issues of fact in the letter ex-
isted. In February, 1990 the court denied Immuno's motion to
reargue. 98 The plaintiff then appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court.
Subsequent to the New York Court of Appeals decision, the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review a grant of sum-
mary judgment dismissing a libel action in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co.'99 In light of this decision, the Court granted Im-
muno certiorari, vacated the judgment of the New York Court
of Appeals and remanded the case for further consideration. 00
Finally, in January, 1991-eight years after the suit was
filed-the New York Court of Appeals, on reconsideration, reaf-
firmed its earlier ruling by dismissing the plaintiff's complaint
on the grounds that the letter to the editor was protected
opinion. 1
C. The Immuno Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In Immuno the majority opinion'held that McGreal's letter
to the editor qualified for protection under both state and fed-
eral constitutional law and New York common law as an expres-
sion of conservationist concern over the use of endangered spe-
cies for medical research. In finding the letter to the editor
protected opinion, the court emphasized its context and content.
First, the majority analyzed Milkovich. The Immuno court
interpreted Milkovich as narrowing the federal opinion privilege:
"[I]t appears that the following balance has been struck between
First Amendment protection for media defendants and protec-
tion for individual reputation: except for special situations of
loose, figurative, hyperbolic language, statements that contain or
imply assertions of probably false fact will likely be actiona-
2"" 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989).
,' 75 N.Y.2d 866, 552 N.E.2d 179, 552 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1990).
,' 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
200 497 U.S. 1021 (1990).
201 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991). Immuno's appeal of




ble. ' 20 2 Despite the New York court's reading of Milkovich, how-
ever, it still found the letter to the editor privileged opinion. The
court found two assertions of implied fact in the letter under
Milkovich-that there is no method for determining if a chim-
panzee has been exposed and that Immuno may release infected
chimps into the wild. Nevertheless, it found the letter protected
under federal law because Immuno failed to meet its burden of
proof.2
03
Second, the majority reasoned that the letter to the editor
was protected opinion, whatever the outcome under Milkovich,
under'the New York Constitution. The court found its constitu-
tion's free speech guarantee more expansive than the First
Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.204 The court
202 77 N.Y.2d at 245, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
203 Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912. A libel plaintiff has the
burden of proof to establish the falsity of factual assertions. See Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Furthermore, there is a strong tradition of using
summary judgment to dispose of libel suits. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 256, 567 N.E.2d at
1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918; see Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531, 416 N.E.2d
557, 435 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1980) (encouraging the use of summary judgments in meritless
libel suits); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (same).
20 The state constitution's free speech provision provides, in part, that: "Every citi-
zen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects ... and no law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 8; see generally Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 248-53, 567 N.E.2d at 1277-80, 566
N.Y.S.2d at 913-16; Richard J. Tofel, "Every Citizen May Freely... Publish": Protect-
ing the Press Under the New York State Constitution, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1040 (1989)
(reviewing the development and expansion of the New York Constitution's free speech
guarantee).
It is well established that a state constitution may be more expansive than the fed-
eral Constitution's corresponding provisions. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983),
the Supreme Court found a challenged search and seizure to be constitutional under
federal law. The Court held, however, that "[i]f the state court decision indicates clearly
and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and indepen-
dent state grounds, this Court will not undertake to review the decision." Id. at 1033. In
People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986), the New York
Court of Appeals held that the simple parallel citation of federal and state constitutional
provisions may provide such an independent and adequate state ground for a decision.
The Immuno court clearly stated that the letter to the editor was protected opinion
under separate and independent state grounds. 77 N.Y.2d at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1277,
566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
More controversial is under what circumstances a state constitution should be relied
upon. This topic is a source of much discussion, including among judges on the New
York Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice
and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 402-04 (1987) (arguing that states are the ulti-
mate guarantors and generators of individual rights); Vito J. Titone, State Constitu-
tional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L REV.
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noted that the federal Constitution sets only minimum stan-
dards while states have an additional responsibility to meet
state needs and expectations.0 s In the end, the Immuno court
found the letter to the editor protected under the state
constitution.
Accordingly, the court interpreted the McGreal letter by ex-
amining the Olman factors. The Immuno court criticized the
Milkovich Court for collapsing the Olman factors of the literary
and social contexts and rejected the "fine parsing" of fact from
opinion in Milkovich.2 0 6 The court noted that isolating the alleg-
edly libelous' statements from the letter's context "may result in
identifying many more implied factual assertions than would a
reasonable person encountering that expression in context. 20 7
Accordingly, the majority relied on Steinhilber v. Alphonse,208 in
which New York adopted Oilman, to undertake a contextual
analysis of the letter. 09 The majority noted in examining the
431, 436-38 (1987) (arguing that there should be strict limits on the state judiciary's role
regarding state constitutional construction questions).
New York courts have relied on the state constitution to protect its citizens' civil
liberties since 1856. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (striking down a state
statute making unlawful the possession and sale of "intoxicating liquors" because it de-
prived individuals of property without due process of law). This reliance on the New
York Constitution has continued. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d
521, 531, 523 N.E.2d 277, 289, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1988) (Kaye, J., concurring) (nonconfi-
dential photograph .taken by reporter in newsgathering and kept as a resource was pro-
tected from compelled disclosure under both the federal and state constitutions); Matter
of Beach v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d 241, 255, 465 N.E.2d 304, 311, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765, 772
(1984) (Wachtler, J., concurring) (reporter's testimonial privilege not only constitutional
under the First Amendment but also under state constitutional free speech clause); Bel-
lanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87
(1981) (state statute prohibiting topless dancing in bar was unconstitutional under state
free speech guarantee), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982).
20" Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
2.6 Id. at 244, 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
"I Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
208 68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986); see also McGill v.
Parker, 179 A.D.2d 98, 109, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91, 98 (1st Dep't 1992) (interpreting Immuno
as reaffirming Steinhilber's adoption of Olman); NYCLU Amicus Brief at 3 n.1, Im-
muno, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (No. 23545-84) (arguing that
the Steinhilber court was acting as a "common law tribunal" in its contextual analysis).
20. [W]e believe that an analysis that begins by looking at the context of the
whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose.., better balances the
values at stake than an analysis that first examines the challenged statements
for express and implied factual assertions, and finds them actionable unless
couched in loose, figurative or hyperbolic language in charged circumstances...
. [S]tatements must first be viewed in their context in order for courts to de-
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broader social context of letters to the editor that such letters
offer both initial letter writers and respondents a forum to per-
suade readers and the broader community; such letters persuade
not because they may appear in any particular publication, but
because the writer is persuasive. The majority stated that a let-
ter to the editor provides an important public forum
not only because it allows persons or groups with views on a subject of
public interest to reach and persuade the broader community but also
because it allows the readership to learn about grievances, both from
the original writers and from those who respond, that perhaps had
previously circulated only as rumor; such a forum can advance an is-
sue beyond invective.210
Next, the Immuno- court examined the literary context of
the letter. In so doing, it noted that the letter involved the pub-
lic controversy around animal testing and that an average reader
would understand the letter's meaning, given the specificity of
the letter's language and the literary genre of such letters.211 The
court concluded that the letter was protected opinion under the
state common law's adoption of Olman. It noted that the letter
was not placed on the front page but rather the editorial
page-a recognizable context. The court reasoned that, even
without an editorial note, the average Journal reader would un-
derstand the letter to be of opinion, not fact, resting on the au-
thority of the letter writer, not the Journal. It was "plain to the
reasonable reader of this scientific publication that McGreal was
voicing no more than a highly partisan point of view. ' 212 In the
termine whether a reasonable person would view them as expressing or imply-
ing any facts.
77 N.Y.2d at 254, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (citations omitted).
210 Id. at 253, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
211 Id. at 252-55, 567 N.E.2d at 1278-81, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17. The majority cate-
gorized the animal rights topic as one of "public interest," id. at 253, 567 N.E.2d at 1280,
566 N.Y.S.2d at 916, and a matter of "public controversy," id. at 254, 567 N.E.2d at
1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916. Therefore, the piece was protected to ensure "the full and
vigorous exposition and expression of opinion on matters of public interest." Id. at 255,
567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 384, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1309, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 953, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 969 (1977)).
212 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917. This was especially
true because the Journal of Medical Primatology is read by a "highly specialized group
of readers." Id. at 253, 567 N.E.2d at 1280, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916. Thus, the average Jour-
nal reader has a "well-developed understanding of the issues." Id. (quoting Immuno, 145
A.D.2d 114, 129, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129, 138 (1st Dep't 1989)).
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end, the court ruled that the letter to the editor was protected to
assure the preservation of the free speech function of letters to
the editor. 13
2. Concurring Opinions
Judge Simons agreed with the majority's decision to grant
summary judgment to Moor-Jankowski. He contended, however,
that the letter to the editor should be protected opinion on fed-
eral grounds only and that the majority erred in its state analy-
sis since Immuno failed to meet its burden of proof under fed-
eral law.214 Judge Simons observed that whether Milkovich was
read as narrowing or maintaining current federal opinion protec-
tions, the majority's contextual analysis of the letter to the edi-
tor was irrelevant since Immuno failed to establish that the as-
sertions of fact in the letter were false. Therefore, "a narrow
view of Milkovich in which context is not controlling, is inconsis-
tent with the discussion on State law in which context becomes
critical. '21 5 Additionally, Judge Simons found that because the
majority decided Immuno on an independent, state basis, it cir-
cumvented judicial procedure by foreclosing a subsequent ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court, thereby violating es-
tablished rules of judicial restraint and uniformity.2 0
Judge Hancock also agreed with the majority that summary
judgment was properly granted. Like Judge Simons, he reasoned
that the appeal should have been resolved under federal law
only.217 Yet, Judge Hancock concluded that because Milkovich
and its discussion of context left federal law "undiminished," a
213 The court stated that in holding the letter to the editor protected opinion, "the
cherished constitutional guarantee of free speech is preserved." 77 N.Y.2d at 256, 567
N.E.2d at 1282, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 918. The Immuno court viewed letters to the editor as
contributing to the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
917; see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. The court also viewed letters to the
editor as promoting democratic self-government. 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1282,
566 N.Y.S.2d at 918; see supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
214 77 N.Y.2d at 259-60, 567 N.E.2d at 1284-85, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21 (Simons, J.,
concurring).
215 Id. at 260, 567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (Simons, J., concurring).
216 Id. at 261, 567 N.E.2d at 1285, 566 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Simons, J., concurring).
217 77 N.Y.2d at 268, 567 N.E.12d at 1290, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (Hancock, J., concur-
ring). While Judge Hancock argued that there are some cases where a decision based on




contextual analysis to determine the average readers's response
to McGreal's letter was appropriate.21
Finally, Judge Titone also concurred with the majority's
granting of summary judgment. He contended, however, that the
Immuno decision should rest on state common law grounds only
and, more specifically, on the fair comment privilege.2 19 At the
same time, Judge Titone noted that the majority's contextual
analysis under Olman remained appropriate under New York's
fair comment privilege.
220
III. AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR THE MEDIA REPRINTERS OF
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
While the New York Court of Appeals disagreed about
whether letters to the editor should be analyzed under state law
(either constitutional or common law) or federal law in Immuno,
all agreed that letters to the editor are a special type of expres-
sion deserving special protection. In Immuno the values of free
expression were "best effectuated" by providing Moor-Jankow-
ski "some latitude to publish a letter to the editor on a matter of
legitimate public concern-the letter's author, affiliation, bias
and premises fully disclosed, rebuttal openly invited-free of
defamation litigation."22' However, the New York Court of Ap-
peals declined to create an absolute privilege for letters to the
editor. 2 Yet "[ulnder any standard other than an absolute priv-
ilege, the threat of a lawsuit hangs over the head of a publisher
like the sword of Damocles; the danger is not that the sword
drops but merely that it hangs. '223 When the media act as bill-
21 Id. Judge Hancock therefore disagreed with both the majority's and Judge
Simons's opinions that the Ollman contextual analysis had changed under Milkovich.
29 Id. at 263, 266, 567 N.E.2d at 1286, 1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 922, 924 (Titone, J.,
concurring) (quoting Immuno, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 556, 549 N.E.2d 129, 132, 549 N.Y.S,2d
938, 941 (1989)).
220 77 N.Y.2d at 266, 567 N.E.2d at 1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
221 Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (1991).
222 Id. at 245, 567 N.E.2d at 1275, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 911 ("not ... all letters to the
editor are absolutely immune from defamation actions"). The New York Civil Liberties
Union ("NYCLU") submitted an Amicus Brief on behalf of Moor-Jankowski proposing
such a privilege. NYCLU Am icus Brief at 19-24, Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77
N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1992) (No. 23545-84).
222 See Alexander D. Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking
the Bastion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 501, 533 (1981).
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boards, providing a forum for free expression, the print media
and their readers should not risk being penalized. Such a privi-
lege would immunize from liability journals and newspapers that
reprint letters to the editor and encourage the publication of
such special types of expression, reflecting the Immuno court's
recognition of the unique role letters to the editor play in foster-
ing public debate.
A. The Need for an Absolute Privilege: The Media's Censor-
ship of Letters to the Editor
Current libel law encourages the media to censor themselves
in their reprinting of letters to the editor.224 Such censorship oc-
curs whenever an editor rejects a letter for its possible legal im-
plications rather than for journalistic reasons. 220 Admittedly, the
media defendant tends to win letters to the editor libel suits
eventually.226 Yet the uncertainty created by the existing multi-
factor approach, the likelihood of paying defense costs and the
risk of paying large libel judgments fosters potential censor-
ship.227 One of every eight letters is rejected by editors due to
224 As one commentator noted:
If the media are to be held responsible in libel actions for the content of these
communications, they must exercise control Such control unwisely gives the
media the right to censor paid advertisements, letters, and signed columns.
Placing responsibility on the media for these pieces ignores the essential role
the press plays in providing access to the public and segments of it to exercise
their rights of free expression.
FORER, supra note 12, at 181.
22 See David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX L. Ry 422,
430-31 (1975); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 365-66 (1974) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that requiring a guarantee of truthfulness leads to "self-
censorship when publishers, fearful of being unable to prove truth or unable to bear the
expense of attempting to do so, simply eschew printing controversial articles").
26 See Marc A. Franklin, A Critique of Libel Law, 18 U.SF L. Ray. 1, 14-18 (1983)
(while the media win almost all the suits against them for publishing letters to the edi-
tor, the threat is that editors are fearful of taking risks by publishing non-mainstream
views in this libel-sensitive climate).
2" See, e.g., McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 717 F.2d 1460, 1466
(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Even if many [libel] actions fail, the risks and high costs of litigation
may lead to undesirable forms of [press] self-censorship."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US.
374, 389 (1967) ("Fear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent
misstatement, even fear of the expense involved in their defense, must inevitably cause
publishers to 'steer... wider of the unlawful zone' and thus create the danger that the
legitimate utterance will be penalized.") (citations omitted). But see Herbert v. Lando,
568 F.2d 974, 997 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting) ("The mere existence of a libel
cause of action chills the exercise of the editorial judgment. That is the whole idea."),
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
libel concerns. 28 One survey found that approximately twelve
percent of responding newspapers had been sued over a letter to
the editor and sixty-three percent of the editors surveyed said
that the risk of a libel suit in the letters section was quite high,
with twenty-six percent responding that the risk is higher in the
letters section than elsewhere in the newspaper.220
These numbers, while not staggering, are evidence that edi-
torial choices are shaped by fear of libel, thus undermining the
free speech purposes served by letters to the editor. Further-
more, even the ultimate victory in letter to the editor libel suits
by a journal or newspaper does not encourage the media to pub-
lish letters to the editor. When the choice is between publishing
a controversial letter that raises the possibility of libel litigation
or reprinting a "safe" letter, editors will "steer clear" of risk and
practice editorial caution. 3 0 An absolute privilege for the media
to reprint letters to the editor can effectively reduce the free
speech chill created by potential libel litigation, notwithstanding
the potential dangers posed by such a privilege.
1. The Financial Cost
The libel lawsuit tests the financial resources of defendants
as reflected in defense costs, court awards and insurance premi-
ums. Pretrial defense costs alone may involve tremendous
rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Michael Massing, The Libel Chill: How Cold Is It Out There?,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. May-June 1985, at 2 (arguing that the chilling effect concept
has been overused and, like crying wolf too often, rings hollow); Lewis, supra note 170, at
603 (The American press "often cries that doom is at hand.").
228 Pasternack, supra note 10, at 314.
2 Id. A 1979 survey by the Ontario press council revealed that 19 of 28 daily news-
papers were influenced by Canadian libel law in that they were "more cautious" in their
handling of letters to the editor. Martin, supra note 13, at 193. But see Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972) (The Court rejected evidence presented by the press to
support the establishment of a confidentiality privilege since the surveys "must be
viewed in the light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees.").
"I See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (self-censorship will make the
press "steer far wider of the unlawful zone"). The experience of Moor-Jankowski in Im-
muno is a telling example. He exercised a high degree of editorial caution: he extended a
right of reply option; he prefaced the letter with an editorial note; the letter writer was a
well-known advocate; and the Journal held the letter for close to a year before publish-
ing it. Notwithstanding these cautionary steps, Moor-Jankowski was sued for libel. The
Immuno court noted that "[t]he chilling effect of protracted litigation can be especially
severe for scholarly journals, such as defendant's, whose editors will likely have more
than a passing familiarity with the subject matter of the specialized materials they pub.
lish." 77 N.Y.2d 235, 256, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 917 (1991).
(Vol. 58:1439
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AFTER IMMUNO
amounts of money. The high costs are due to both discovery and
pretrial legal actions. The average cost of a libel case before trial
hovers around $150,000 in legal fees.231 While roughly ninety
percent of libel suits are dropped, settled or dismissed, the aver-
age figure for awards in libel trials in 1990 and 1991 was approx-
imately $5.2 million. 32 Yet almost all of these judgments were
overturned on appeal or given a directed verdict. 33 In Immuno
the lawsuit cost Moor-Jankowski over one million dollars to de-
fend-and he "won" eight years later. 34
I" Abrams, supra note 53, at 90; see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-77 (1979)
(the First Amendment does not provide a privilege for the editorial process and exten-
sive, in-depth discovery of a defendant's editorial process is appropriate). Eighty-three
percent of media libel cases "involve a formal judicial proceeding on the merits of the
libel claim before" trial. Seth Goodchild, Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance
to Modern Libel Law, 75 GEO. LJ. 315, 322 n.45 (1986) (quoting unpublished Iowa Re-
search Project Study findings).
2s2 Libel Case Awards Found Increasing, N.Y. TnsaS, Sept. 20, 1992, at A34 [herein-
after Libel Case Awards]. When libel suits reached trial in 1989 and 1990, newspapers
lost two-thirds of the cases and the average award was about $4.5 million. Alex S. Jones,
News Media's Libel Costs Rising, Study Says, NY TwsEs, Sept. 26, 1991, at A28. From
1981 to 1984 the average damage award was $2 million. In 1985-1986 the average was
$1.2 million. In 1987-1988 media defendants won one-half of all libel trials and the aver-
age award was $432,000. Fewer libel actions-about 15-went to trial in 1989-1930 com-
pared to the average of 30 in the early 1980s. Id. However, the decline is not necessarily
a reflection of fewer libel actions, but may be a "greater willingne s" on the part of (1)
judges to dismiss such cases, (2) newspapers to settle, or (3) less aggressive neus cover-
age for fear of libel action. Id. (emphasis added). Million-dollar awards continue. In 1930
there were two decisions in libel trials awarding $58 million and $34 million. Libel Case
Awards, supra, at A34.
13 See supra note 130; see also Fred Friendly, Is Our Libel Law a Threat to Free
Speech?, WASH. PoST, Jan. 15, 1984, at D1 (Most of the 10 largest punitive awards
granted at trial court level in libel suits ranging from $37 million to $1.3 million were
reduced or reversed on appeal; however, the publicity attending the original awards en-
couraged new suits, making it likely that "news organizations [will] be bankrupted by
interminable legal maneuvering and decent journalists [will] be hamstrung in their deci-
sion-making.").
13, Dr. J. Moor-Jankowski wrote a letter to the editor to The New Yort. Times
about the "real-life effects" of the Immuno lawsuit. He penned:
I am a full-time research professor at the New York University School of
Medicine and the unpaid editor of the small, international Journal of Medical
Primatology. For the last seven years (10 percent of life expectancy of an
American male) I have been sued .... So far, my legal expenses exceed $1
million ... [T]he seven years of proceedings consumed most of my time, cur-
tailing my scientific activities. The court victory may still not effectively pro-
tect me or other editors of small professional journals from the chilling effect
of suits by wealthy corporations using our legal system to discourage criticism
of their activities. We need a legal deterrent to prohibitively costly, meritless
libel suits that misuse the court system to undermine our First Amendment
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Win or lose, libel insurance premiums increase for the few
who can afford such coverage in the first place.235 Insurers ask
potential insureds if they run letters to the editors; those that do
are more likely to pay higher insurance premiums than those
who do not have such a section.2 36 Increasing premiums will
make journal and newspaper editors even more wary about pub-
lishing controversial letters to the editor as well as more inclined
to settle those suits that do arise. Moreover, insurance compa-
nies put great pressure on defendants to settle: in Immuno letter
writer McGreal's insurer settled the case with Immuno, over her
objections, for $100,000-leaving her to bear another $35,000 in
legal fees.237 Thus, the specter of a libel lawsuit raised by a con-
troversial letter to the editor can be costly and undermines the
First Amendment purposes served by such letters.
2. The Lack of Newspaper Competition
Furthermore, there is a media monopoly. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "Chains of newspapers, national newspapers,
national wire and news services, and one-newspaper towns, are
the dominant features of a press that has become noncompeti-
tive and enormously powerful and influential. ' '238 There are
fewer truly competitive newspapers per community, in particu-
lar, and fewer independent owners of mass media outlets, in gen-
eral.239 In 1900 there were 2042 daily papers and 2023 owners
rights.
Moor-Jankowski, View from Inside a Landmark Libel Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991,
at A28 (letter to the editor) (emphasis added).
1" See Goodchild, supra note 231, at 325. This hurts smaller publications the most.
One major libel insurer requires that insureds bear 20 percent of all legal expenses gener-
ated whether the case is won or lost. See Michael Massing, Libel Insurance: Scrambling
for Coverage, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Jan-Feb 1986, at 35.
28 Franklin, supra note 7, at 656 n.37, 659 n.65.
137 Gest, supra note 6, at 64. McGreal reported that her insurance company spent
$250,000 to defend her. Hentoff, supra note 182, at A23.
138 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974); see generally
BEN H. BAGDIKIAN. THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (1983). In 1983 50 corporations controlled
most of the country's media. Id. at xv-xvi. By 1988 the number had declined to 26. Id.;
see Richard Pollack, The Media Monopoly, THE NATION, Feb. 13, 1988, at 209 (book
review of second edition).
"I The number of cities with competing newspapers declined from 502 in 1923 to 35
in 1978. James N. Rosse, The Decline of Direct Newspaper Competition, J. CoMm.,
Spring 1980, at 63, 64. The same decline is mirrored in communities. In 1980 there were
172 communities with two or more daily newspapers while in 1990 that number stood at
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while in the 1980s there were approximately 1700 daily newspa-
pers owned by only 760 owners.240 With the increase in one-
newspaper towns and the rising cost of running a paper, there
are fewer newspapers and, correspondingly, less space for letters
to the editor sections. Before, when a letter to the editor was not
published by one paper, a letter writer could go to another news-
paper.241 This is no longer the case.24 2 Accordingly, there are
fewer opportunities for citizen-critics to exercise their First
Amendment rights via letters to the editor. A privilege that pro-
tects the media from potential libel liability will encourage re-
maining newspapers and journals to publish controversial
letters.
3. Limited Access
With limited print media competition and the specter of
huge litigation costs, media outlets are tempted not to print con-
troversial letters to the editor. As one commentator suggested:
"Even among competing newspapers, a monopoly situation may
exist for letter writers because only one of the papers may have
carried the story that triggered the letter. It is not likely that the
other paper would carry letters that addressed an issue it had
not reported upon. ' '24 3 In general, letters to the editor are a way
for non-majority groups to reach the media.24 But for letters to
the editor, "[f]reedom of the press is guaranteed only to those
who own one." 2" As Justice Black noted, this is especially true
for the disenfranchised who "do not have enough money to own
or control publishing plants, newspapers, radios .... .,22 More-
63. Alex S. Jones, At Many Papers, Competition is at Best an Illusion, NY Tims,
Sept. 22, 1991, at 18. In 1991 only 12 of 63 community papers had separately owned,
truly competitive rivals. Id.
2,0 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 238, at 8.
241 Franklin, supra note 7, at 662.
242 Id. at 662 n.78. And so it is easy for management with no print competition to
select letters to the editor with the aim of reducing the risk of libel litigation. See Frank-
lin, supra note 226, at 15.
242 Franklin, supra note 7, at 662 n.78; see FoRER, supra note 12, at 181-82 ("If the
media are held responsible for libelous statements by those who sign their letters... it
will seriously limit access to the public and correspondingly restrict the public's ability to
read and hear any voices other than those vetted by the media.").
I" See TALKING BACK, supra note 4, at 6; BARRON, supra note 34, at 44-52.
25 A.J. Liebling, The Wayward Press: Do You Belong to the New Journalism?,
NEW YORKER, May 14, 1960, at 105, 109.
240 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
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over, letter writers voicing controversial and unpopular opinions
have less access to the media than those expressing more main-
stream views. In Immuno the letter to the editor was written by
McGreal, a respected advocate of primate rights in academic
medicine with a track record of effective leadership. 47 The pub-
lishing of a letter signed by this well-known advocate frightened
the defendant editor enough to delay its publication for a year.
This bodes poorly for less well-known letter writers in publica-
tions with editors less expert in the specific area of contro-
versy.248 Often letters authored by political outsiders with con-
troversial, non-mainstream positions use more "potentially
libelous speech" and are more likely to be rejected, therefore re-
ducing the diversity of views exchanged on the editorial page.24 9
Efforts to mandate access to the press have failed.25 0
247 See Hentoff, supra note 182, at A23. McGreal "is a persistent, effective paladin
of primates at risk, having, for instance, convinced the late Indira Gandhi to ban the
exportation of rhesus monkeys. She has also changed the practices of several American
university primate animal programs that she considered inhumane." Id.
2,0 On the other hand, perhaps a letter penned by a leis-known advocate will have a
better chance of being reprinted if being a better-known advocate and letter writer de-
creases those chances.
249 See Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel,
Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J.
283 (arguing that offensiveness of speech unwittingly serves a useful role in society). Less
acceptable views, or those views that run counter to-the "capitalistic goals of privately-
owned, for-profit media," are therefore suspect. Dominic Caristi, The Concept of a Right
to Access to the Media: A Workable Alternative, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 103, 108 (1988)
("In this age of intense media competition for advertising revenue, politically controver-
sial sparks will be avoided for fear customers may turn to less 'offensive' material.").
210 See generally BARRON, supra note 34. Barron proposes that the government step
in and establish "gateways" to ensure access to the marketplace to promote diversity of
coverage. See also Ingber, supra note 34, at 5 (intervention in the market is needed
because of media monopoly control and limited access to the media by powerless or dis-
favored groups). There have been legal efforts to establish a right of access to letter to
the editor sections. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the
Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute that required newspaper publishers to
provide right-of-reply space to a political candidate criticized by the newspaper. The
statute interfered with editorial autonomy because "[a] newspaper is more than a passive
receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decision made as to limitations on the size and content of the
paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment." Id. at 258; see also Lord
v. Winchester, 190 N.E.2d 875 (Mass. 1963) (letter writer unsuccessfully sued paper
when it refused to publish his letter opposing the paper's editorial position), appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 376 U.S. 221 (1964); Wall v. World Publishing Co., 263 P.2d
1010 (Okla. 1953) (reader unsuccessfully sued newspaper for refusing to publish his letter
based on a breach of contract argument).
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Controversial letter writers' lack of access to the media, in
turn, denies the polity the opportunity to be informed about
non-mainstream ideas. Therefore, to enhance the First Amend-
ment value of an informed populace, legal obstacles that dis-
courage the print media from publishing a diverse selection of
submitted letters to the editor should be eliminated.
4. Libel as an Ideological "Sledgehammer"
The Immuno case also exemplifies the misuse of defamation
law by corporations seeking to silence public criticism through
letters to the editor. As one civil liberties letter writer penned:
"[I]t is the libel laws themselves which are most often bran-
dished as weapons. Far from being a means for the little person
to stand up to powerful interests, they are most often invoked
by the powerful to protect those interests. '2 1 Instead of libel
being a vehicle to discern the truthfulness of facts and to guard
against harm caused through the media, it is a way for the pow-
erful to silence competing ideologies. Small newspapers and
journals, like the Journal of Medical Primatology, are particu-
larly vulnerable.25 2 In Immuno the multi-national corporation
used libel law as a "sledgehammer to crack the tiny nut of a
letter to the editor. 25 3 Clearly, the Journal's 300 subscribers did
not pose an actual threat to Immuno. Nor did McGreal. As the
"' Gara LaMarche, Associate Director, New York Civil Liberties Union, Libel Laws
in the Service of Power Interests, N.Y. TImS, Aug. 16, 1983, at A22 (letter to the editor).
Similarly, in Karnell v. Campbell, 501 A.2d 1029 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), the
court expressed its "deep concern" with a lawsuit by developers against letter writers
because of "the chilling effect that plaintiffs lawsuit in these rather unremarkable cir-
cumstances may have on other citizens who would ordinarily speak out on behalf of what
they perceive to be the public good." Id. at 1036. One commentator noted that "[tlhe
modern way to silence criticism is to price it out of existence with protracted libel litiga-
tion." LEWIS, supra note 65, at 221. The use of libel law as a tool for potential harass-
ment was recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring). Such "intimidation" lawsuits by corporations, primarily directed against cit-
izen-critics, are on the rise. For a discussion of intimidation suits, see Gest, supra note 6,
at 64; Bryan Holzberg, Defamation Suits "Chill" Activists; Developers File Against
Protesters, NAT'L L.J., July 25, 1988, at 3; Amy Dockser Marcus, Intimidation Lausuits
Creep Up On Critics, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1990, at BI; Eve Pell, Libel as a Political
Weapon, THE NATION, June 6, 1981, at 1.
22 The Journal is not a "hardy publisher," easily able to engage in unpopular or
controversial issues under the current system of libel law. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" See LEwIs, supra note 65, at 216.
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appellate division commented in Immuno, "to enhance the value
of such [libel] actions as instruments of harassment and coercion
[is] inimical to the exercise of First Amendment rights" and was
used by Immuno "as an instrument for... suppression." 2" Fur-
thermore, Immuno has employed similar libel tactics to silence
public criticism internationally.255 A media privilege to reprint
letters to the editor would insulate publications, including
smaller, more vulnerable media outlets, from liability and allow
them to foster public debate.
B. A Proposal for an Absolute Privilege for Reprinters of Let-
ters to .the Editor
The First Amendment value of public debate by citizen-
critics demands the creation of a libel-free zone-an absolute
privilege-to ensure that the media has adequate "breathing
space" to publish diverse letters. 56 Privileges are created to bal-
ance the competing interests of freedom of expression and the
prevention of attacks on reputations. Courts and legislatures
grant privileges to foster free expression when the speech is
highly valued: "[C]onduct which otherwise would be actionable
is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in further-
ance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to
protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the
plaintiff's reputation. '257 There are two kinds of privileges: abso-
lute and qualified. For reprinters of letters to the editor, an ab-
solute privilege best effectuates First Amendment values and the
dual goals of Sullivan: to avoid censorship by the media due to
the threat of libel and to foster public debate. Furthermore, its
creation is merely an extension of existing common law privi-
leges generally and the fair report privilege specifically. While a
Immuno, 145 A.D.2d 114, 128, 143, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137, 147 (1st Dep't 1989).
z" See Hentoff, supra note 6, at A21 ("Immuno ... has filed libel suits against its
critics in a number of countries."); see also Sierra Club et al., Amicus Brief at 9-10,
Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906
(1991) (No. 23545-84) (noting that the release of Immuno's plan to do hepatitis research
in West Africa generated much debate in Europe and "Immuno responded to the criti-
cism generated during these debates with a barrage of libel lawsuits against individuals,
conservation organizations and publications").
25 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
2157 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 114, at
815 (5th ed. 1988).
[Vol. 58:1439
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AFTER IMMUNO
privilege raises the specter of potential abuses, without such a
privilege the pall cast over the First Amendment will continue to
silence the exchange of diverse views in the publication of letters
to the editor.
1. The Weaknesses of a Qualified Privilege
A qualified or conditional privilege is a rebuttable presump-
tion that protects speech when public policy demands such en-
hanced treatment, but that can be lost if abused. 5 8 Qualified
privileges apply to protect publishers, the interests of others, the
common interest, communications of one who may act in the
public interest, and fair comment on matters of public
concern.
259
A qualified privilege for letters to the editors is an ineffec-
tive privilege. The very nature of a qualified privilege involves
judicial balancing, thus raising the specter of media censorship
for fear of potential libel suits. The same criticism levied against
current defamation law-the criteria of fact versus opinion, the
matter of public concern and the plaintiff's status-can be used
against the creation and application of a qualified privilege for
letters to the editor. These obstacles are, in part, the catalyst for
creating such an absolute privilege. As Chief Justice Burger said
in discussing the application of the attorney-client privilege,
when a court fails to clarify the scope of a privilege, it "neither
minimizes the consequences of continuing uncertainty and con-
fusion nor harmonizes the inherent dissonance of acknowledging
that uncertainty while declining to clarify it. ''2o An unclear priv-
ilege is scarcely better than no privilege at all.
2. The Strengths of an Absolute Privilege
Unlike a qualified privilege, an absolute privilege precludes
defamation actions, regardless of the content of the statement.
Generally, absolute privileges are geared toward the identity of
the speaker or the forum of the speech.2"' Such privileges are
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 599 (1977); Deborah Daniloff, Employer
Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining References and Chilled Communica-
tions in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS W. 687, 709 (1989).
... KEETON, supra note 257, § 115, at 824-32.
UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 404 (1981) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
261 SMOLLA, supra note 9, §§ 8.02-.06, at 8-15 to -19.
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granted in very specific situations when there is an important
societal need to protect the communication. Absolute privileges
have protected defamatory statements made in judicial proceed-
ings, in legislative proceedings, in certain executive communica-
tions, with the consent of plaintiff and where mandated by law,
such as interspousal tort immunity.2 '
An absolute privilege was embraced by Justices Black,
Douglas and Goldberg in two concurring opinions in Sullivan.
As Justice Black penned in his Sullivan concurrence: "An un-
conditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is
what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First
Amendment. I regret that the Court has stopped short of this
holding indispensable to preserve our free press from destruc-
tion. '' 2 3 The "stopgap measure" adopted by the Court in Sulli-
van-the actual malice standard-fails to avoid litigation or the
threats it poses in the letters to the editor context.264 Moreover,
202 KEETON, supra note 257, § 114, at 815-24; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 583-92 (1977).
263 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
concurring); see id. at 297-305 (Goldberg and Douglas, JJ., concurring); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 359 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); see generally Edmond
Cahn, Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes:" A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962) (interviewing Justice Black on his position that there are abso-
lutes in the Bill of Rights); Del Russo, supra note 223, at 501 (absolute privilege for the
press should apply when the matter discussed is one of public or general concern); Lewis,
supra note 167, at 619-21 (speech relevant to public affairs should be absolutely privi-
leged); Franklin, supra note 7, at 667-68 (proposing absolute privilege for letters to the
editors dealing with issues of self-governance).
One proposal is for an "absolute" privilege for statements about (1) a public official
and matters related to his or her public position; (2) a public figure on matters related to
his or her public status; and (3) anyone (public or private) on a matter of public concern.
See Gilbert Cranberg, ACLU Moves to Protect All Speech on Public Issues from Libel
Suits, CIVIL LIBERTIES, Feb. 1983, at 2; Gilbert Cranberg, ACLU: Second Thoughts on
Libel, COLUMB. JOURNALIsM REVIEW Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 43 [hereinafter Second Thoughts].
On the one hand, limiting the application of the privilege to letters involving a "subject
of public concern" only is, in essence, an absolute privilege, since the policy defines pub-
lic concern as "anything having an impact on the social or political system or climate,"
and thus is arguably all-inclusive. SECOND THOUGHTS, supra, at 42. On the other hand,
this is a broad qualified privilege because it limits the privilege to letters involving "legit-
imate matters of public concern" which creates the same uncertain mire exacerbated by
the weakness of the public concern factor previously discussed. See supra notes 160-69
and accompanying text.
264 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring) (establishing the actual mal-
ice standard has not stopped the potentially "huge verdicts lurking just around the cor-
ner for the Times or any other newspaper . . . which might dare to criticize public
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an absolute privilege avoids the post-Sullivan pitfalls of the ex-
isting multi-factor approach that persist after Milkovich in de-
termining whether a statement in an allegedly libelous letter to
the editor is protected.
First, an absolute privilege provides the "outcome predict-
ability" needed to encourage the media to take the risk of pub-
lishing controversial letters to the editor 0 1 It avoids the in-
volvement of the court or the media in the vagaries of multi-
factor approaches. Without an absolute privilege publishers of
letters to the editors will avoid the risk inherent in that
balancing.
Second, such a privilege will not necessarily change the dif-
ferent levels of credibility granted various publications. 6 Some
argue that any kind of absolute privilege undermines the effect
of libel law to deter "scandalmongering and other lower forms of
journalism. '26 7 Yet the lack of an absolute privilege has not
stopped some publications from publishing malicious letters to
the editor. As the Court noted, "A responsible press is an un-
doubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not man-
dated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot
be legislated. '26 Moreover, there is the possibility that those ed-
itors that step over the line will be subject to professional and
community criticism.26 For example, take the situation where a
letter is submitted and an editor knows the letter contains a
damaging, blatant falsehood. This situation will be very rare be-
cause, generally, editors will not know if such a falsehood exists.
If the paper is to maintain its reputation, the paper will, most
likely, exercise its editorial discretion and not publish the letter.
In comparison, under Sullivan and its progeny, the many chinks
in the wall of existing defamation law would allow a court to
entertain a libel action in which the republisher had no direct
knowledge of the falsehood.
officials").
265 See Leslye deRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a Federal Journal-
ist's Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q 779, 803 (1991).
266 See FRANKLYN SAUL HAmtAN, SPEECH AND LAw IN A FaEE SocimET 51-52 (1981)
(arguing that an absolute privilege will have little effect on the credibility of the press).
267 Second Thoughts, supra note 263, at 43; see also Del Russo, supra note 223, at
543 (decreasing competition among the media may result in "ls incentive to correct
mistakes if libel laws are unduly protective of the press").
"I Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
2' Franklin, supra note 7, at 665-66.
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Third, a letter to the editor reflects the letter writer's, not
the reprinter's, beliefs and, therefore, the media should not be
held liable for the letter writer's beliefs. The media cannot pub-
lish a letter with reckless disregard of the truth because only the
letter writer possesses that knowledge.
2 70
Fourth, republishers are no more likely to abuse this privi-
lege than others afforded such immunity, such as elected offi-
cials, who already enjoy an absolute privilege.271
Finally, an absolute privilege provides both a defense and a
cure for chilling speech. Generally, in letters to the editor, more
speech cures an individual's reputation. Recourse should be re-
buttal, not litigation, because speech is "a highly effective
weapon in reply to criticism. '272 As Justice Brandeis eloquently
stated, "If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of educa-
tion, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced si-
lence. ' 273 It would be in the interests of editors, then, to publish
replies to controversial letters.
There are, of course, potential dangers posed by creating
such a privilege. No one can ignore that "some people are badly
damaged by false and reckless speech. ' 274 As the Court has elo-
quently explained in its denial of an absolute privilege to critics
of public officials:
[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at odds with the premises of
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which eco-
nomic, social, or political change is to be effected. Calculated false-
hood falls into that class of utterances which "are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality." . . .Hence the
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
1" "Neither the publisher nor the editor can, by definition, claim to possess an hon-
est belief in the opinion expressed in the letter. It is not their opinion. The opinion
expressed in a letter to the editor is the opinion of the letter writer alone." Martin, supra
note 13, at 189. This is arguably why a letter writer should remain liable. See infra note
309 and accompanying text.
21 Franklin, supra note 7, at 665-66.
272 See Lewis, supra note 170, at 621.
7 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes,
J., concurring).
74 Nat Hentoff, Free Speech: The Price is Going Up, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1983,
at 34 (supporting an absolute media privilege).
[Vol. 58:1439
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AFTER IMMUNO
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection."
A difficult scenario that highlights the potential dangers of
an absolute privilege to reprinters of letters is the phenomenon
of "outing." "Outing" is a controversial practice of publicly re-
vealing the gay or lesbian sexual orientation of individuals.276
Some describe "outing" as a "vicious invasion of a subject's pri-
vacy," while others find it an act which "help[s] the gay cause by
increasing the number of gay role models."2 77 Assume a writer
submits a letter to the editor disclosing falsely that an individ-
ual is gay.2 71 Should the media be liable for reprinting such a
letter?
It is important to note that current defamation law does not
clearly protect the reputational interests of the injured plaintiff
under its existing legal categories. Is the "outing" a statement of
opinion or a statement of fact? On the one hand, "outing" is an
opinion about a person's sexual orientation. On the other hand,
involuntary outing clearly injures an individual's reputation. Is
the "outed" individual a public or private figure? Proponents of
outing may argue that the very act of "outing" concerns an indi-
vidual's public character and that an individual's participation
in a particular controversy-to be gay and not be out of the
closet-transforms a private figure into a public figure.270 Argua-
bly, this is especially true where the individual is involved in
making policy decisions on gay and lesbian issues, such as when
"I Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (citations omitted); see also Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
276 Ronald F. Wick, Out of the Closet and Into the Headlines: "Outing" and the
Private Facts Tort, 80 GEO. L.J. 413, 413 (1991) (defining "outing" as "making public
allegations of homosexuality in an effort to force the subject to come 'out of the closet'
and go public with his lifestyle"); see generally David H. Pollack, Forced Out of the
Closet: Sexual Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing", 46 U MAlWi L Rwv 711
(1992).
27 Wick, supra note 276, at 414.
278 If the letter's allegations were true, the letter would probably not be found
libelous. First, truth is a defense against a libel cause of action. However, there is the
issue of defining the term "gay" and accompanying issues of verification. Jon E. Grant,
Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the Su-
preme Court's Categorical Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L Rnv 103, 122-23 (1991). Sec-
ond, it is unlikely that courts will determine that a truthful allegation of homosexuality
is defamatory. Wick, supra note 276, at 415. Third, under the public-private figure di-
chotomy, the very nature of outing may transform a private figure into a public one.
Grant, supra, at 126.
279 Grant, supra note 278, at 126.
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a high-level Pentagon official is gay and enforces the ban against
gay men and lesbians in the military. Opponents of outing may
argue that sexual orientation, whether a private or public figure,
plays no part in defining the public character of an individual.280
Will courts view outing as a matter of public concern, thereby
supporting efforts by some in the gay rights movement to force
people to accept the position of role models? Or will outing be
considered a private issue, implicating an individual's sexuality
only?
An absolute privilege arguably creates an atmosphere that
may encourage such false accusations. Yet an absolute privilege
will not necessarily encourage false attacks on reputations. In
the "outing" example, injured plaintiffs could still bring an ac-
tion against the letter writer, thereby creating a disincentive for
the letter writer to submit a "false" outing letter to the media. 281
Furthermore, the media have their reputations as well as their
editorial discretion to consider.282 In the end, even under an ab-
solute privilege, strong disincentives exist that discourage the re-
publication of letters constituting "utterly gratuitous attacks."28 3
Therefore, a privilege will not encourage more potential abuses
when the media are merely acting as bulletin boards in re-
printing letters to the editor than those already present under
existing defamation law. Moreover, the absolute privilege offsets
the vagaries of existing legal categories in most letter to the edi-
tor cases.
3. The Foundation for an Absolute Privilege: An Extension
of Existing Privileges
While a qualified privilege fails to protect adequately re-
printers of letters to the editor, existing qualified privileges do
provide the building blocks to an absolute privilege for letters to
the editor. When a certain type of expression is deemed impor-
tant, a privilege is created to protect such expression. In general,
the law offers such protections to the media to encourage their
republication of certain types of expression under the fair com-
280 Id.
"' See infra note 309 & supra note 270 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
283 NYCLU Amicus Brief at 24, Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567
N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991) (No. 23545-84).
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ment, neutral reportage and fair report privileges. In particular,
just as the fair report privilege encourages the media to reprint
official proceedings as long as the reporting is accurate, fair and
not motivated by ill will, so would an absolute privilege en-
courage them to reprint letters to the editor.
a. Fair Comment
Courts initially recognized the importance of public debate
by creating the conditional fair comment privilege. The privi-
lege-an affirmative defense-initially attached only to matters
of legitimate concern based on true facts that were reported
fairly.28 4 Recently, the privilege has been extended to a variety
of matters of public interest, including comments regarding indi-
viduals and institutions involved in community matters, such as
churches, charities and private organizations involved in public
2865service. At the same time, that qualified privilege is easily lost
if the defendant has "bad motive" or "ill will" in the republica-
tion.286 While the fair comment privilege remains in use today,28
it is too limited to protect reprinters of letters to the editor.288
I" SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 6.02[1], at 6-6; see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
tt See Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 882 (La. 1977) (The privilege covers
comments involving "persons, institutions or groups who voluntarily injected themselves
into the public scene or affected the community's welfare, such as public officials, politi-
cal candidates, community leaders from the private sector or private enterprises which
affected pubic welfare, persons taking a public position on a matter of public concern,
and those who offered their creations for public approval such as artists, performers and
athletes."); see also Dairy Stores v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986);
Kotlikoff v. Community News, 444 A.2d 1086 (N.J. 1982).
Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 232.
" See, e.g., Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 253, 266, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1288, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 924 (1991) (Titone, J., concurring); Turbevile v. Abernathy, 367
F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. N.C. 1973) (letter critical of a counselor's discharge protected under
fair comment privilege); Sparks v. Boone, 560 S.W.2d 236 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (criticism
of former university president running for public office in letter protected under fair
comment privilege); Alleman v. Vermilion Publishing Corp., 316 So. 2d 837 (La. Ct. App.
1975) (letter to the editor charging a doctor with failing to treat a child in a hospital
emergency room not libelous, and newspaper not liable, because the statement was con-
ditionally privileged as fair comment on a matter of public concern).
2" The Immuno court noted that common law fair comment defense was limited. 74
N.Y.2d 548, 556, 549 N.E.2d 129, 132, 549 N.Y.S.2d 938, 941 (1990); see Cahill Gordon &
Reindel, Amicus Brief at 10, Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 253,567 N.E.2d
1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991) (No. 23545-84) (fair comment defense is extremely limited
and would fail to protect much criticism); Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179
N.Y. 144, 155-56 (1904) (presented with a newspaper article critical of a professor, the
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Letters to the editor may misstate facts. Also, to determine
whether a letter concerns a "matter of legitimate interest" raises
the specter of conflicting judicial characterizations. The outcome
would depend, in part, on whether the court determined that the
press reprinted a letter even though the opinion expressed in the
letter was not sincerely held by the media reprinter and whether
the strength of the language made an otherwise "fair" comment
"unfair."28 9 Therefore, the fair comment doctrine faces the same
limitations in requiring the separation of fact from opinion as
under Olman. At the same time, the privilege is important be-
cause it is a well-recognized, albeit narrow, judicially-created
protection of free speech. It provides a building block in the cre-
ation of an absolute privilege for the republication of letters to
the editor.
b. Neutral Reportage
In 1977 the Second Circuit in Edwards v. National Audu-
bon Soc'y, Inc.290 created the neutral reportage privilege. The
court created this privilege because there is a public interest in
newsworthy statements by prominent persons, notwithstanding
the press's doubts regarding their truth. 91 The Edwards court
established four prerequisites for the privilege. First, the charges
must relate to a pre-existing public controversy or generate a
public controversy in their own right. Second, the charges must
court distinguished criticism and defamation, with criticism protecting only public sub-
ject matter that avoids indulging in personalities). But see SMOLLA, supra note 9,
,§ 6.02[2], at 6-7 ("[T]he fair comment privilege came to embrace a range of plaintiffs at
least as broad as, and arguably, broader than, the modern constitutional protections de-
fined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.").
289 Sack & Karle, supra note 60, at 59.
290 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Edwards v. New York Times, 434
U.S. 1002 (1977). In Edwards the National Audubon Society was sued for charging a
public figure with being a paid liar in the context of a controversy over whether DDT
adversely affected bird life.
291 The Second Circuit stated that it did
not believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment to sup-
press newsworthy statements merely because it has serious doubts regarding
their truth. Nor must the press take up cudgels against dubious charges in
order to publish them without fear of liability for defamation. The public in-
terest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensi-
tive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such
charges without assuming responsibility for them.
556 F.2d at 120 (citation omitted).
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be made by a prominent organization, public official or public
figure. The Edwards court further qualified the chargers with
the need to be responsible. Third, the charges must be made
about a public figure or official. Fourth, the reported charges
must be "neutral," that is, not republished with an unbalanced,
interested report." 2 Commentators and courts are divided on
whether the privilege is a significant or helpful contribution to
the exchange of information about public controversies. 0 3 New
York courts are similarly split.
2 4
The neutral reportage privilege is not useful to most citizen
letter writers since it only amplifies the voices of public figures
already heard by the media. Yet letters to the editor penned by
citizen-critics remain newsworthy despite the media's doubts re-
garding their truth. Moreover, the Edwards multi-factor ap-
proach suffers from the same achilles heel as the Olman test:
since it is unclear what, if any, limits exist on "newsworthiness,"
the approach is subject to a variety of judicial characteriza-
tions. 295 The right of citizens to be fully informed by letters to
29 Id.; see also Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 (2d Cir. 1980)
(libel action by mayor against magazine that printed article stating that the mayor had
once been accused of rape, had gotten the charges dropped, and had paid the accuser,
the article was not covered by the neutral reportage privilege because the article did not
simply report the charges, but concurred in them).
'"For critiques of the neutral reportage privilege, see SmoLLA, supra note 9,
§ 4.1414], at 4-70; James E. Boasberg, With Malice Toward None: A New Look at De-
famatory Republication and Neutral Reportage, 13 HASTINGS Co ,,. & EN'r. LJ. 455
(1991) (proposing an expanded privilege to protect all accurately republished defamatory
statements made by or about public figures); Ray IV. Cambell, Note, The Developing
Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 V- L REv. 853 (1983) (asserting that the basis for the
privilege within the First Amendment is limited and should be narrowly construed);
Mark W. Page, Comment, Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.: The Neutral Reportage Privi-
lege and Robust, Wide Open Debate, 75 MINN. L REv. 157 (1990) (arguing that the neu-
tral reportage privilege should provide stronger First Amendment protections). For a re-
view of courts that have adopted or rejected the privilege or that remain undecided, see
Cambell, supra, at 859 & nn. 55-57.
See Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 478-479, 446 N.YS.2d 836, 842 (4th
Dep't) (rejecting privilege), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 458 N.YS.2d 538 (1982); Ru.so v.
Padovano, 84 A.D.2d 925, 926, 446 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (4th Dep't 1981) (upholding privi-
lege); Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 288, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 284 (2d Dep't
1980) (upholding privilege); Orr v. Lynch, 60 A.D.2d 949, 950, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (3d
Dep't) (supporting privilege). aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 903, 411 N.YS.2d 10 (1978); Hellman v.
McCarthy, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1789, 1794 (N.Y. Sup. 1984) (rejecting privilege).
205 See Note, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the De-
fense of Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHL L REV. 722, 725-26 (1963) (exploring the impact of
the notion of newsworthiness and its potential for undermining invasion of privacy ac-
tions). Prosser noted that "news" included "all events and items of information which
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the editor, then, requires the press to be free from liability in
publishing them. Even though the neutral reportage privilege
does not cover letters to the editors by many citizen-critics, it
provides yet another example of judicially-created protections
for speech deemed important. Similar reasoning can provide a
basis for the creation of an absolute privilege for the media in
reprinting letters to the editor.
c. Fair Report
Like the fair comment and neutral reportage privileges, the
fair report privilege is an exception to the republication doc-
trine. The qualified privilege of fair report, or official report, was
created to encourage the media to report on proceedings of offi-
cial bodies and official documents by immunizing them from lia-
.bility. The privilege was created by English Courts in 1796 to
protect accurate news coverage of trials.""6 It was adopted by
American courts as early as 1856.297 The fair report privilege
permits the publisher of material from proceedings to repeat de-
famatory statements made at those proceedings without re-
printer liability and even with knowledge that the publication's
defamatory statement is false.298 At the same time, this privilege
is applicable'only to those reports that are accurate and unmoti-
vated by ill-will.299 The fair report privilege encompasses legisla-
tive, administrative and executive official proceedings.300 In ad-
are out of the ordinary humdrum routine" and that have an "indefinable quality of in-
formation which arouses public attention." KELrON, supra note 257, at 860 (emphasis
added).
290 Curry v. Walter, 126 Eng. Rep. 1046 (C.P. 1796) (creating privilege); The King v.
Wright, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396, 1398-99 (K.B. 1799) (extending privilege to republication of
parliamentary reports); Wason v. Walter, 4 L.R.-Q.B. 73, 96 (1868) (extending privilege
-to republication of parliamentary debates).
297 Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 301 (1856) (published medical society discipli-
nary proceedings found privileged).
298 RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977) ("The publication of defamatory
matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting
open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is
accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported."); Beary v. West
Publishing Co., 763 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.) (fair report privilege is an absolute privilege), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
29 Sack & Karle, supra note 60, at 31-32.
300 See, e.g., Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir.
1979) (publication of grand jury indictments protected under the fair report privilege
since the article was a fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceeding about charges
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dition, the privilege recognizes that the public has a right to
know about non-government activities and thus includes public
meetings.30 1 This privilege has been adopted in New York and
includes the reporting of non-public meetings.302
The fair report privilege is the most helpful model in creat-
ing an absolute privilege for reprinters of letters to the editor.
Just as a republisher is not liable for printing any falsehoods
uttered during an underlying governmental or public proceeding,
a republisher should be protected from liability for a falsehood
in an underlying letter. In both cases the republisher merely has
to transmit the information accurately. Furthermore, the same
rationale underlies the fair report and the letters to the editor
privileges: just as newspaper and journal readers have the "right
to know" about public proceedings, so readers have a right to
know citizens' criticisms of official and non-official activities
through letters to the editor. Unlike the fair report privilege,
however, the proposed absolute privilege for letters to the editor
would be truer to the First Amendment.
-30 3
against plaintiffs for smuggling and selling drugs); Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d
Cir.) (publication by Time magazine of summary of F.B.I. documents identifying plain-
tiff as member of organized crime protected under the fair report privilege), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 836 (1981).
301 See, e.g., American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Assn, 435
N.E.2d 1297, 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (veterinary medical association); Borg v. Boas, 231
F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1956) (local law enforcement public meeting). Therefore, there is
an intersection between the fair report and neutral reportage privileges.
302 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 74 (McKinney 1992); see also Lee v. Brooklyn Union
Publishing Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 247 (1913). The statute grants, in part, an absolute privi-
lege to editors and publishers to provide "a fair and true report" of a government pro-
ceeding. See, e.g., Freeze Right Refrigeration v. City of New York, 101 A.D.2d 175, 475
N.Y.S.2d 383 (1st Dep't 1984) (libel action against newspaper and city government for
article about non-public investigation by city agency into practices of air conditioning
repair shop privileged under fair report immunity); Gurda v. Orange County Publica-
tions Div. of Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 705, 706, 436 N.E.2d 1326, 451
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1982) (newspaper that reported on judicial proceedings protected under
the fair report privilege). For a review of different state fair report privileges, see Sack &
Karle, supra note 60, at 31-32.
:03 See generally Kathryn Dix Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The
Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 NYU L Rev 469 (1979) (propos-
ing a constitutional fair report privilege that is consistent with the First Amendment);
Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUN L. REv 1102 (1964) (arguing that
under Sullivan, the fair report privilege must meet First Amendment standards).
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4. The Absolute Privilege Proposal
An absolute privilege, extending the fair report privilege, is
necessary to protect adequately the First Amendment purposes
of letters to the editor, despite the potential dangers posed by
such a privilege. An absolute privilege for the media would im-
munize the media from liability when they accurately reprint
letters to the editor, notwithstanding their knowledge of a false
fact. To ensure that the media does not abuse such a privilege,
however, minimal conditions must apply.
First, the letter should be signed."0 4 A signature require-
ment will help ensure the exclusion of anonymous attacks, help
identify the letter for the reader and make the writer assume
responsibility, including potential liability, for the content of the
letter. Therefore, if an editor published an anonymous letter to
the editor, the editor would remain liable. 0s
Second, the publication should ensure the authenticity of
the letter by confirming the identity of the author and, where
appropriate, the author's affiliation. 0 6 Such an investigation will
help readers more fully understand the perspective of the letter
writer. At the same time, an editor should not have the responsi-
bility of investigating each and every letter for falsity.
30 7
304 Franklin, supra note 7, at 666; NYCLU Amicus Brief at 24, Immuno AG v.
Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991) (No. 23545-
84). This does not appear to be a heavy, or new, burden, since most newspapers already
reject letters from anonymous sources. Steve Pasternack & Suraj Kapoor, The Letters
Boom, THE MASTHEAD, Fall 1980, at 24 (ninety-seven percent of surveyed editors auto-
matically reject anonymous letters).
3*1 See, e.g., DiBernardo v. Tonawanda Publishing Corp., 117 A.D.2d 1009, 1011, 499
N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (4th Dep't 1986) (newspaper liable for publishing anonymous letter to
the editor).
I0" Franklin, supra note 7, at 666. Again, this condition is not difficult for newspaper
editors since most tend to do so already. Pasternack, supra note 10, at 314 (eighty-eight
percent of the newspapers surveyed said they verified letters to the editor). In Mazart v.
State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. Cl. 1981), university trustees were not
found agents of a student newspaper that published a letter to the editor without verify-
ing the falsely signed letter writers. The court noted that "the need to verify the author-
ship of a letter wherein the purported author appears to be libeled is rudimentary." Id.
at 1102, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
'' As Professor Marc Franklin observed:
Some argue that society would benefit if the paper helped the public determine
truth and falsity on all published matters because the public has no indepen-
dent basis for deciding what side is right. The difficulty is that this will surely
discourage the press from printing many matters that warrant early airing
before the editor can learn enough about the merits to take a stand.
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Third, a publication would remain liable as an originator if
it endorsed, adopted or solicited the allegedly libelous letter to
the editor. 808
Finally, letter writers should remain potential defendants °09
There may be less of an incentive on the part of plaintiffs to sue
individual letter writers who, in general, will be more judgment
proof than media entities. At the same time, money is not al-
ways the motivating factor: in Immuno the corporation sued the
journal for silence, not money. Letter writer liability, however,
will discourage false, gratuitous letters from being submitted to
editors, especially since the media will be immune from liability.
CONCLUSION
Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski is the latest and most dis-
turbing example of the dangers posed by not having an absolute
privilege for the special type of expression embodied in letters to
the editor. The outcome in Immuno by the New York Court of
Appeals would remain the same under the proposed absolute
privilege. An absolute privilege, however, avoids the amorphous
distinctions and the vagaries of changing courts and is more re-
flective of the First Amendment values that letters to the editor
embody. Letters to the editor are a way for "outsiders" to par-
ticipate in public debate. Since current libel law only exacer-
bates media censorship of controversial letters to the editor, the
privilege must be more securely anchored in the First Amend-
ment. The media should be encouraged, not discouraged, by the
law to reprint editorial letters. Therefore, to promote the First
Franklin, supra note 7, at 664. Courts differ as to whether a newspaper's failure to ascer-
tain the accuracy of assertions made in a letter to the editor constitutes actual malice.
Current newspaper practice tends to include fact-checking of potentially libelous letters.
See Pasternack, supra note 10, at 314 (sixty-eight percent of newpaper editors are likely
to contact the letter writer to discuss content and the same percentage is likely to assign
a staff person to fact-check the letter's contents.)
3 Franklin, supra note 7, at 665-66; NYCLU Amicus Brief at 24, Immuno AG v.
Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991) (No. 23545-
84).
. Franklin, supra note 7, at 665 (an absolute privilege for letters to the editor
should not absolve the defendant letter writer of liability).
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Amendment purposes of letters to the editor, an absolute privi-
lege should be created to provide access to the print soapbox
and to encourage robust debate among citizens.
Donna R. Euben
